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“A jurisdictional train wreck.” 1
I. RECONSTRUCTING A TRAIN WRECK
Three unrelated decisions from the United States Supreme Court
initiated a tectonic shift in the separation of power in American law.
These three decisions reconfigure and re-sculpt traditional judicial
deference afforded to the executive branch. Together these decisions
alter Chevron deference.2 These decisions change interpretation of the
separation of power in U.S. constitutional law.
Chevron was an environmental dispute interpreting the federal
Clean Air Act, and these three recent Court decisions similarly interpret
other provisions of the same Act. The Supreme Court, de novo, in
Michigan v. EPA, mandated a new quantitative cost consideration as the
regulatory prerequisite before the executive branch may enact legally
defensible regulations.3 A year after the Michigan decision, in West
Virginia v. EPA,4 the Supreme Court took an unprecedented step: More
than two years before a legal challenge could reach it or was argued
before the lower court,5 and within less than three weeks of an
application, the Court applied a stay directly to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule, rather than to
a lower court judicial decision on appeal, and no party in the matter was
able to point to any previous instance of this. The movants’ applications
for a stay and its granting heavily relied on Michigan v. EPA,6 and UARG

1. Lynn Garner, FERC Comm’rs Split on Party Lines Over EPA’s Carbon Rule for
Power Plants, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (July 29, 2014),
http://info.bna.com/climate/summary_news.aspx?ID=274977. Congressional testimony in
2014 by FERC Commissioner Clark characterized the conflict between proposed
environmental regulation in the CPP to assist climate goals and the pressing counter
requirement to protect power system reliability and resiliency.
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
4. W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
5. Id.; see Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court put the brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power
Plan, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 9 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-powerplan/?utm_term=.dd512a870f7; Erin Ryan, The Clean Power Plan, the Supreme Court’s Stay
and
Irreparable
Harm,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Feb.
16,
2016,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-ryan/the-clean-power-plan-the-_b_9259858.html.
6. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
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v. EPA,7 analyzed in detail below.8 This stay of the CPP embodies in
law a progressive retreat from the mainstay of Chevron deference for
agency decisions embodied in recent Supreme Court decisions, analyzed
below, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,9 King v. Burwell,10 and
Michigan v. EPA.11 These cases shift the balance of power to construe
Congressional statutes from the executive branch to the courts.
Along with the Court reconfiguring executive branch power, the
approach and methods of the executive branch also changed. In this
simmering constitutional law, new legal ingredients were added with the
change from the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration.
The Obama Administration calculated and claimed estimated net global
benefits of its Clean Power Plan addressing global warming; in 2017, the
Trump Administration instituted ‘America first’ accounting which now
renders the program no longer cost-justified under accounting for only
U.S. benefits.12 Changes in the legal mathematical algorithm create
night versus day differences in whether the same executive branch
regulation is cost-justified, depending on whether one counts:
 Climate change mitigation benefits occurring outside the United
States, over which U.S. law has no legal jurisdiction, and across
borders which U.S. regulation does not reach
 Indirect so-called “co-benefits” that the Clean Power Plan does not
address13

This article navigates this fundamental new Supreme Court
redetermination of constitutional separation of powers. The Supreme
Court decisions construe power over one of the most significant
controversies of the twenty-first century—control of and remedies for
escalating global warming. Even though the Supreme Court’s indefinite
stay of executive action in West Virginia suspends national climate
7. Utility Air Recognition Group (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2013). The
application of the twenty-nine states for a stay referred to and relied on UARG v. EPA
throughout.
8. See infra Section IV.B-C; W. Va. v. EPA, No. 15A773 (Feb. 9, 2016) 2016 WL
502947 (mem.).
9. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (disfavoring new agency interpretation).
10. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (disregarding opinion of nonexpert agencies).
11. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (prerequisite de novo agency consideration of costs
before regulation).
12. See EPA, EPA TAKES ANOTHER STEP TO ADVANCE PRESIDENT TRUMP’S
AMERICAN FIRST STRATEGY, PROPOSES REPEAL OF ‘CLEAN POWER PLAN’ (Oct. 10, 2017)
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumpsamerica-first-strategy-proposes-repeal. The repeal of the CPP is estimated by the Trump
Administration EPA to save thirty-three billion dollars in avoided compliance costs in 2030.
13. See id. Instead of considering global climate benefits, the Trump administration EPA
now only shows domestic benefits.
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policy, any next steps to address climate change became even more
dynamic with the change in Presidential administrations.
Section II of this article examines the Obama Administration Clean
Power Plan, its costs, and its legally disputed benefits. The Supreme
Court took the wholly unprecedented step to indefinitely stay this
executive rule years before the legal challenge reached the Supreme
Court or was decided by the court of appeals on the merits,14 whereafter
the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly delayed the required decision on the
merits for more than one year.15 The issue is now suspended in legal
limbo.
Section III examines what a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commissioner called a “jurisdictional train wreck.”16 Section III tracks
the impact of the 2017 change in Presidential administrations on legal
interpretation, recent executive orders to implement a new view of
executive power, and use of the Congressional Review Act regarding
major recent domestic regulation. Given the recent Supreme Courtmandated economic cost considerations in agency rulemaking, Section
III analyzes how a new Presidential administration can and has changed
the administrative law algorithm through a narrower recalculation of:
 Only domestic U.S. benefits of the Clean Power Plan,
 Exclusion of any global benefits beyond the geographic footprint
of America, and
 Exclusion of “co-benefits” not regulated by the CPP

Section IV analyzes in legal detail the fulcrum created by three
recent Supreme Court opinions changing the power of executive branch
agencies to make law. First, Section IV analyzes the still-pending
litigation directly challenging the Clean Power Plan, triggering the
highly unusual early Supreme Court indefinite stay years before the case
reached it and before any court had reached a decision on the merits.17
Next, Section IV analyzes the Supreme Court ruling that the executive
branch cannot “tailor” statutory provisions to its preferences.18 Third,
Section IV analyzes the Court decision mandating executive branch
consideration of costs before initiating certain new regulation.19
Together, these three decisions change the Chevron doctrine as applied
14. Erin Ryan, The Clean Power Plan, the Supreme Court’s Stay and Irreparable Harm,
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-ryan/the-cleanpower-plan-the-_b_9259858.html.
15. See W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
16. Garner, supra note 1.
17. See W. Va., 136 S. Ct. 1000.
18. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014).
19. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
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to U.S. constitutional and administrative law, a change which former
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens called “truly mind-boggling
. . . a free-wheeling statutory decision can do even more harm . . . to the
. . . Court itself—than misinterpretations of the Constitution.”20
Section V examines what happens when adminstrations change and
regulations are repealed or Court legal stays are extended. Section V
also documents how the Amercian system is resilient enough to find
alternative legal routes to ends. To date, even without the Supreme
Court allowing the Clean Power Plan to proceed under the new
administration, power sector carbon emissions are still on track to
achieve the dramatic reduction required if the CPP were in place and not
stayed or repealed. Section VI takes the next step to examine technology
by technology at a micro level how this is occurring with the law stayed,
through larger forces at work.
Section VII analyzes the long-term implications for constitutional
and administrative U.S. law. These decisions permanently limit
discretion of an agency to tailor their implementation of a statute,21 inject
mandatory new quantitative cost consideration even when not expressly
required by statute,22 and indefinitely suspend executive branch
regulations years before the Supreme Court gets the case merits to
review.23 This trio of decisions recongfigures traditional Chevron
deference, a foundation of American law for the last third of a century.24
Powers of the executive branch are more restricted, and agencies have
been stripped of some traditional discretion. This is a significant
restructuring of American law.

20. Former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, Speech to ABA Meeting in
Chicago (July 31, 2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS_Speech_ABA_Section_of_Litigatio
n_International_Human_Rights_Award_Luncheon_07-31-15.pdf.
21. See generally UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427.
22. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
23. See W. Va., 136 S. Ct. 1000.
24. See Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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II. THE LEGAL MECHANISMS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN ENACTMENT
AND/OR REPEAL
The change in the foundation of administrative law separating the
power of different branches of government is in even sharper relief
because the underlying challenged law affects one of the most pressing
issues of the century—climate change and global warming. This
involves both energy and environmental policy. Electric power
production is the most significant source of CO2 emissions in the United
States which contributes to climate change.

Figure 125
Initiatives during the Obama administration to regulate the
environment focused on the electric power sector, on the use of coal
resources on hazardous and climate changing emissions, and on
mitigating climate change. These initiatives required states to take the
laboring hand by implementing choices to accomplish these policies, and
included:
 Joining with most other nations in the world in the 2015 Paris
Accord.26

25. See EPA, TOTAL U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR IN 2014
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhousegas-emissions_.html.
26. See UNITED NATIONS, LIST OF PARTIES THAT SIGNED THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON
22 APRIL,
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/04/parisagreementsingatures/.
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 Restricting power plant hazardous mercury emissions, since
overturned and remanded by the Supreme Court in Michigan v.
EPA.27
 Restricting CO2 global warming emissions through the Clean
Power Plan focused on coal-fired power plants, which has since
been preliminarily enjoined by the Supreme Court in West
Virginia v. EPA.28

This article focuses on each of these prongs in which the Court
changes administrative and constitutional law in the United States. We
start, with the Clean Power Plan.
A. Federal CPP Standards; State Plans For Implementation
1. The Administrative Rule
The Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan was a foundational
U.S. environmental regulatory action; it counted international benefits
to meet Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement 2015 pledges to reduce
carbon emissions.29 EPA Secretary Pruitt criticized the Paris Agreement
as internationally imbalanced: “China and India got away, the largest
producers of CO2 internationally, got away scot-free. They didn’t have
to take steps until 2030. So we’ve penalized ourselves through lost jobs
while China and India didn’t take steps to address the issue
internationally.”30 When Syria joined the Paris Climate Accord in late
2017, it left the United States as the only organized nation neither to have
joined nor remained within the Accord.31
The Clean Power Plan exclusively targeted fossil fuel electricity
production for reductions of carbon.32 The Obama Administration’s
October 2015 Clean Power Plan is a 460-page rule targeting CO2
27. See infra Section IV.C.
28. W. Va., 136 S. Ct. 1000; see infra Section II.A.2.
29. See infra Section III.C. As part of the Kyoto Protocol which affected only
approximately three dozen developed countries and the more recent Paris Agreement which
took the next international step of non-legally binding pledges of all countries to reduce
warming emissions, countries pledged different amounts of reduction of their GHGs
emissions from different year baselines and of different amounts.
30. Martin Pengelly, Trump to Sign Executive Order Undoing Obama’s Clean Power
Plan, GUARDIAN, Mar. 26, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/26/trump-executive-order-cleanpower-plan-coal-plants.
31. Brady Dennis, As Syria Embraces Paris Climate Deal, it’s the United States Against
the
World,
WASHINGTON
POST,
Nov.
7,
2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/07/as-syriaembraces-paris-climate-deal-its-the-united-states-against-theworld/?utm_term=.3f4d0b134644.
32. See infra notes 50, 55-56.
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emissions from large power generation facilities33 in order to achieve a
required thirty-two percent reduction of annual CO2 emissions from new
and existing power plants34 by 2030, measured against a baseline of 2005
carbon emission levels from that year’s power generation plants.35 In
certain states, this would require up to a fifty percent cut in carbon
intensity of existing electric power generation.36 EPA received 2.5
million comments from environmental groups, regulated industry, the
public, and states, in response to its proposed CPP regulation, under
which, each state would be required to develop standards of performance
to limit CO2 emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired generating
facilities.37
The CPP requires state-differentiated plans to satisfy federallymandated state requirements. It modifies parts of the Clean Air Act,
which provides a comprehensive scheme for air pollution control,
addressing three general categories of pollutants emitted from stationary
sources: criteria pollutants, hazardous pollutants, and “pollutants that are
(or may be) harmful to public health or welfare but are not [hazardous
or criteria pollutants or] cannot be controlled under [those programs.]”38
“Six relatively ubiquitous “criteria” pollutants are regulated under 42
U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410”39: oxides of nitrogen, sulfur dioxide, lead, carbon

33. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661–65,120, RIN 2060–AR33 (Oct. 23, 2015).
34. EPA, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN OVERVIEW,
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview. Between the
rule’s promulgation in 2014 and final rule issuance in 2015, the EPA delayed implementation.
Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665. This included more time for state compliance with a
two-year delay for states filing required plans from 2016 to 2018, and a two-year delay in the
first year of required CO2 reductions, from 2020 to 2022. Id. at 64,669. The EPA’s final
regulation indicates that the goal of this rule is to substitute gas for coal in the generation of
electricity. Id. at 64,667. The EPA increased how much CO2 emissions will have to be brought
down from the 2005 baseline in the next fifteen years from the thirty percent proposed to
thirty-two percent in the final rule. Id. at 64,665.
35. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64665 (Oct. 23, 2015); see also Juliet Eilperin &
Steven Mufson, EPA Proposes Cutting Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Plants 30% by
2030, WASHINGTON POST (June 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/epa-to-propose-cutting-carbon-dioxide-emissions-from-coal-plants-30percent-by2030/2014/06/01/f5055d94-e9a8-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html.
36. Paul DeCotis, What the Clean Power Plan Means for You & How to Tackle Building
a Compliance Strategy, ENERGY BIZ (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.energybiz.com/article/14/11/what-clean-power-plan-means-you-how-tacklebuilding-compliance-strategy.
37. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS OF
PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE HAS EMISSION FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES:
ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS at 1-1 (Sept. 2013),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposalria.pdf.
38. Final Brief for Respondents at 3, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 &
No.12-1151 (Mar. 9, 2015).
39. Id.
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monoxide, particulate matter, and ozone.40 “Once EPA issues air quality
criteria for [these] pollutants, the Administrator of the Agency must
propose primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for
them at levels “requisite to protect the public health” with an “adequate
margin of safety.” “ 41
Apart from criteria pollutants and under a separate section of the
Act, “hazardous air pollutants” are regulated under 42 U.S.C. § 7412.42
“EPA must publish and revise a list of “major” and “area” source
categories of hazardous pollutants, and then has a nondiscretionary
obligation to establish achievable emission standards for all listed
hazardous air pollutants emitted by sources within a listed category.”43
“The final major category of pollutants covered by the [Clean Air Act,]
harmful pollutants not regulated under the NAAQS or hazardous
pollutant programs are subject to regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 7411.”44
“Section 7411 has two main components[:] First, Section 7411(b)
requires EPA to promulgate federal “standards of performance”
addressing new stationary sources that cause or contribute significantly
to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.” 45 “[S]ection 7411(d) authorizes EPA to promulgate
regulations [that require] states to establish standards of performance for
existing stationary sources of the same pollutant” “once EPA has set new
source standards addressing emissions of a particular pollutant.”46 “If a
state fails to submit a satisfactory plan, EPA is authorized to prescribe a
plan for the state, and… enforce plans where states fail to do so.”47
During the Obama Administration, EPA utilized the regulation of
vehicle emissions as the legal initial step in order thereafter to regulate
stationary power plant emissions. Once any substance becomes a
regulated pollutant (whether or not a criteria or toxic pollutant) under the
Clean Air Act, other provisions expand that regulation.48 After the
Massachusetts v. EPA decision four years before,49 the Act began to
regulate greenhouse gasses for light-duty vehicles as mobile sources in
40. See EPA, Criteria Air Pollutants, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants; see
also FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 189 exhibit 5.1, 191 exhibit 5.2.
41. See Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
42. Final Brief for Respondents at 3, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 &
No.12-1151 (Mar. 9, 2015).
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 5.
45. See Murray, 788 F.3d 330.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See EPA, THE CLEAN AIR ACT IN A NUTSHELL: HOW IT WORKS 18 (Mar. 22, 2013)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/caa_nutshell.pdf.
49. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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2011, four years after the Massachusetts v. EPA decision.50 In 2009,
EPA issued a finding that six greenhouse gases cause or contribute to air
pollution which endangers U.S. public health and welfare.51 The
findings, alone, do not substantively impose any requirements on
industry or other entities, but were a prerequisite to issue the CPP
subsequently.52 However, the action was a prerequisite to finalizing
EPA’s greenhouse gas emission standards for cars and light-duty trucks,
which were jointly promulgated by EPA incorporating vehicle fuel
economy standards from the Department of Transportation in 2010.53
Beginning in 2011, these mobile standards triggered requirements for
stationary sources of greenhouse gasses (GHGs).54
In response to that trigger, there was a follow-on requirement that
major new or modified stationary sources with greenhouse gas emissions
automatically were subject to the Act’s New Source Review, which is
an added layer for new or modified sources in areas not in attainment
with the NAAQS to install a stricter Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
(LAER) technology, purchase emission offsets, and other requirements
to restrict emissions. Eighty-four separate cases challenged the rule.55 In
2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied industry and
state motions to stay the endangerment finding and related EPA
regulations, sustaining the agency’s regulatory finding.56
The “categorical” emission limitations are intended, by an “ample
margin of safety,” to regulate pollutants that “may cause, or contribute
to cause, an increase in mortality, or an increase in serious, irreversible,

50. See ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE, FACT SHEET: TIMELINE OF
EPA’S ACTIONS ON GREENHOUSE GASES, (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-timeline-of-epa-actions-on-greenhouse-gases.
51. See id.; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (those
chemicals are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)). EPA issued its finding in
response to the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007), that
required the agency to decide the issue. Id. at 66,499.
52. See EPA, GREENHOUSE GASES, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangermentand-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean.
53. Id.; See also Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010)
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
54. See FACT SHEET, supra note 50.
55. Robin Bravender, 16 ‘Endangerment’ Lawsuits Filed Against EPA Before Deadline,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010,
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/17/17greenwire-16endangerment-lawsuits-filed-against-epa-bef-74640.html.
56. Coal. for Resp. Reg. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curium), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part; UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2013).
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or incapacitating reversible illness.”57 As part of the CPP, EPA
“proposed… performance standards for new power plants under Section
[111(b) of the Clean Air Act,] standards for modified and reconstructed
power plants under Section [111(b) of the Act,] and regulations under
which states would submit plans to address CO2 emissions from existing
power plants under section [111(d) of the Act.]”58 “Under Section 111
of the Clean Air Act, EPA can only [set] standards for… existing sources
and units if it has [already] set standards for… new [units] in the same
category” or of the same type.59
The Clean Air Act New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)
under Section 111(d) require EPA to mandate that each exiting emission
unit meeting the threshold size meet the Best System of Emission
Reduction (BSER). For each state under EPA’s CPP that BSER is
determined based on the mix of each state’s individual existing
generating sources.60 In some states this would demand up to a fifty
percent cut in carbon intensity generation, and in other states, much
less.61 While the rule contained highly differentiated individualized CO2
requirements for each state, each state was left to its own plan on how it
would meet its quantitative power plant CO2 emission reduction
requirement.62 EPA received more than a quarter million rulemaking
comments in 2014 regarding the CPP proposed rule.63 The final rule
increased how much CO2 emissions would have to be brought down
nationwide from the 2005 baseline to 2030; from thirty percent to thirtytwo percent.64 There was a two-year delay for state required filing of
state plans until 2018 with first actual reductions of CO2 delayed until
2022.65
To generate electricity in the United States, EPA’s final regulation
set a goal to substitute natural gas for coal.66 EPA’s rule states that the
“book life” of a coal plant is forty years, and that states in their
57. See U.S.C. §§ 7408-10. This statutory language, as upheld by the court in NRDC v.
EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987), emphasizes that these standards are intended to protect
the public health and welfare with no consideration for the practicalities involved in their
implementation through law.
58. Final Brief for Respondents Environmental Protection Agency at 3, Murray Energy
Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 & No.12-1151 at 8 (Mar. 9, 2015).
59. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, EPA REGULATIONS: TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON
TRACK? R41561 at 20 (Dec. 30, 2016) [hereinafter TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?].
60. EPA,
FACT
SHEET:
CLEAN
POWER
PLAN
OVERVIEW,
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan.html.
61. See DeCotis, supra note 36.
62. Id.
63. See EPA, FACT SHEET: PROPOSED ACE RULE,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/ace_cost-benefit.pdf.
64. See DeCotis, supra note 36.
65. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Aug. 3, 2015).
66. Id. at 64,756.
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compliance filings should consider not allowing operation of older coal
plants under this rule.67 EPA utilized a planning assumption that states
and regional independent system operators (ISOs) should take existing
natural gas combustion turbines, which were running only at a national
forty to fifty percent capacity factor compared to their full operation
capabilities, and increase those facilities to an average seventy-five
percent operating capacity factor to displace coal-fired power.68 This
demonstrates that natural gas-fired combined cycle facilities can operate
at ninety-one percent availability.69
EPA’s final rule eliminated energy efficiency as one of four state
compliance building blocks to reduce CO2 emission, retaining with
improvement of coal-fired power facility heat rates, substitution of
natural gas instead of coal electric facility operation, and construction of
more renewable energy as state “building blocks” to comply with
reduction requirements.70 For those states which refused to comply,
Federal Implementation Plans (FIPs) can be imposed by EPA as
mandatory elements for the states.71
The EPA Clean Power Plan employs Section 111(d) of the Clean
Air Act72 to regulate existing power generation sources that are not
regulated under other sections of the Act.73 For new power plants, EPA
also proposed new executive branch regulations for new CO2-emiting
power plants under Section 111(b) of Clean Air Act.74 Best System of
Emission Reduction applies technology standards to affected plants, and
as proposed in the CPP, would effectively make impossible use of
conventional coal-burning power technology for new plants.75
Conventional coal-fired electric generation facilities will not be able to

67. Id. at 64,872.
68. Id. at 64,800.
69. Id. at 64,799-64,801.
70. Id. at 64,667.
71. Jeremy M. Tarr, The Clean Air Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards: Basics of
Section 111(d), NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIVERSITY, tbl. 1
(Sept. 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_1303.pdf.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
73. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, EPA (June 2, 2014) (providing general information
on plan, factsheets, and press releases); see also Megan Ceronsky, Section 11(d) of the Clean
Air Act—Cooperative Federalism and Performance-Based Standards, ENVTL. DEF. FUND
BLOG (May 20, 2014), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2014/05/20/section-111d-of-theclean-air-act-cooperative-federalism-and-performance-based-standards/.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b).
75. 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014). EPA previously proposed CO2 emission standards
for new power plants in 2012 but withdrew the proposed rule after taking comment. See 77
Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (proposal); 79 Fed. Reg. 1352 (Jan. 8, 2014) (withdrawing
proposal).
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meet the CPP specified level.76 The Clean Air Act’s NSPS must
implement BSER, taking into account costs, environmental impact, and
energy requirements.77 The proposed “New Source Rule” issued by
EPA establishes separate performance standards for new coal-and gasfired power plants.78
EPA determined that carbon capture and storage (“CCS”)79 was an
“adequately demonstrated” technology that qualified as BSER for
purposes of the CPP.80 Many consider this unproven in the United
States.81 At the time of the rule’s promulgation, no operating U.S. plants
used CCS to capture necessary amounts of pollution.82
EPA established a regulatory threshold forty percent lower than
current “best-in-class” coal turbine technologies for new coal-fired
electric generating plants in the CPP.83 This is a level that current
technology for new coal facilities could not meet.84 EPA concurred
without regrets that no new U.S. coal-fired plants would be built between
2015-2020 that could meet its new standards.85 The effect is that the
CPP, by default, indirectly substitutes operation of natural gas and
renewable energy generation for existing coal-fired power.86 EPA’s
76. Seth Hilton, The Impact of California’s Global Warming Legislation on the Electric
Utility Industry, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 10 (2006).
77. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 196-97
(Wolters Kluwer, 7th ed. 2016) (NSPS BSER requirement).
78. “New source” does not include existing sources undertaking modifications or
reconstructions, and certain projects currently under development.
79. EPA
ARCHIVE,
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/201604/documents/cpp-presentation.pdf; see also EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse
Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64509 (Oct. 23, 2015).
80. See EEA TECHNICAL REPORT, AIR POLLUTION IMPACTS FROM CARBON CAPTURE
AND STORAGE (CCS), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/carbon-capture-and-storage.
Facilities deploying CCS technology can filter and capture CO2 from the emission waste
stream and pump it into geologic formations or use it to extract coal-bed methane or oil in
depleted or diminished oil reservoirs. EPA cites four projects currently under development
that will deploy some type of CCS.
81. See American Geoscience Institute, Carbon Capture and Storage Debate Heats Up,
https://www.americangeosciences.org/policy/news-briefs/carbon-capture-and-storagedebate-heats.
82. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59.
83. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CAN FUTURE COAL POWER PLANTS
MEET CO2 EMISSION STANDARDS WITHOUT CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE?, (Oct. 2015),
https://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/EPRI_Can-Future-Coal-Power-Plants-MeetCO2-Emission-Standards-Without-Carbon-Capture-Storage_10.2015.pdf.
84. Id.; See 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,709; see also STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF
INDEPENDENT POWER § 6:7.40 n.9 (Thomson Reuters, 45th ed. 2018).
85. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59.
86. The EPA utilizes a planning assumption that states an independent system operators
(ISOs) should take natural gas combustion turbines, whose history demonstrates that they can
operate at ninety-one percent availability but which are running only at a national forty to fifty
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final CPP regulation reinforces that this rule substitutes natural gas for
coal for the generation of electricity.87
2. The Legal Challenge
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Commissioner
Tony Clark criticized the CPP injecting environmental factors into how
power plants are allowed to run, predicting “a jurisdictional train wreck”
resulting from the CPP under the Clean Air Act attempting to regulate
carbon emissions.88 FERC Commissioner Philip Moeller testified that
the Obama Administration carbon regulations were “an enforcement
regime that would be awkward at best, and potentially very inefficient
and expensive.”89 Commissioner Moeller testified that the CPP rules
would cause “a shift from traditional [executive agency] economic
dispatch to environmental dispatch.”90 The FERC commissioners
“expressed skepticism with the EPA’s assumption that enough natural
gas pipelines will be built over the next five to ten years to allow natural
gas-fired generation to replace thousands of megawatts of retiring coal
generation” as the main prong of the CPP.91
Seventeen state attorneys general filed comments highlighting
“numerous legal defects” and system reliability issues in EPA’s proposal
to regulate power plant emissions under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air
Act.92 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce characterized the Obama
Administration EPA regulations as “a series of one-sided, politicallycharged regulations that are intended to take the place of legislation that
cannot achieve a consensus in the Congress.”93 More than half the states
thereafter sued EPA regarding its authority to issue these regulations.94
The litigation on the CPP attacked its regulation of both existing
and new coal-fired carbon-emitting power plants. While the “marque”

percent capacity factor and increase those to a seventy-five percent capacity factor to displace
coal-fired power. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,799.
87. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015).
88. Garner, supra note 1.
89. Id. Commissioner “Moeller stated that the biggest challenge in implementing the
proposed rule is that electricity markets are interstate in nature,” while EPA has a state-bystate approach for emissions reductions. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Herman Trabish, Comments are in on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan (the attorneys
general of the 17 states that sued were from Oklahoma, West Virginia, Nebraska, Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming), UTILITY DIVE,
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/comments-are-in-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/338783/.
93. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REGULATORY AREAS, ENERGY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, http://www.uschamber.com/regulations/areas.
94. Trabish, supra note 92.
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plaintiffs amongst the various lawsuits against EPA’s CPP were Murray
Energy and the states of Texas and West Virginia, there were numerous
other parties’ lawsuits that in 2016 were consolidated with challenges
from twenty-eight states and more than 120 companies and
organizations into one multi-party case, State of West Virginia, et al. v.
EPA.95 This included more than half the states, as well as various
industries and additional parties that filed petitions in the case.96 Parties
supporting EPA included eighteen states plus sixty cities and towns
participating as interveners.97 Twenty-seven states sued EPA on
promulgation of the CPP rule,98 alleging a violation of the Clean Air
Act.99
There is no federal case law, nor any Environmental Protection
Agency rules, which have, or can, resolve direct conflicts regarding how
one counts environmental ‘benefits’ against the cost imposed on the
operation of power generation units to reduce polluting operation.100
The closest precedent is provocative Supreme Court dicta from forty
years ago in Union Electric,101 wherein the Court held that an owner of
a fossil fuel-fired power generation facility can always “shut down its
plant and curtail electric service” to meet any imposed environmental
requirements. 102
95. COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, CHALLENGING THE CLEAN POWER PLAN,
https://cei.org/litigation/challenging-clean-power-plan-cei-et-al-v-epa.
96. Additional parties included: Oklahoma, North Dakota, Int’l Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Murray Energy Corp., NMA, ACCCE, UARG/APPA, Alabama Power Co. et
al, CO2 Task Force of the Fla. Elect. Power Coordinating Grp., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co.,
Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., United Mine Workers, NRECA et al., Westar
Energy, NorthWestern Corp., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, Chamber of Commerce et al.,
Ass’n of Am. Railroads, Mississippi DEQ, Luminant Generation Co., Basin Electric Power
Coop., Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., Entergy Corp.,
LG&E/KU, West Virginia Coal Ass’n, Newmont Nevada Energy Inv./Newmont USA,
Kansas City Bd. of Pub. Utils., North Am. Coal Corp., Indiana Util. Grp., Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, Genon Mid-Atlantic et al., Prairie State Generating Co., Minnesota Power,
Denbury Onshore, Energy-Intensive Mfrs.’ Working Grp. on Greenhouse Gas Reg., Nat’l All.
of Forest Owners, Biogenic CO2 Coal., Local Gov’t Coal. for Renewable Energy, Am. Forest
& Paper Ass’n/Am. Wood Council, Competitive Enter. Inst. et al.
97. These included: California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Vermont, and Washington), sixty municipalities
from twenty-eight different states, with a total population of thirty-three million, companies
including Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft, the Am. Wind Energy Ass’n & Solar
Energy Indus. Ass’n, 208 Members of Cong. (157 Representatives; thirty-six Senators; fifteen
former members).
98. Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).
100. Steven Ferrey, Broken at Both Ends: The Need to Reconnect Energy and
Environment, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 54, 56-58 (2015).
101. Union Elec. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
102. See id.
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In its 2009 Riverkeeper decision,103 involving the entrainment of
aquatic species on power plant cooling water intake structures, the
Supreme Court held that Congress, in Clean Water Act Section 316(b),
did not categorically forbid EPA from comparing costs to benefits when
determining what is the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impacts of power plant cooling water intake
structures.104 EPA was left the authority to decide not to engage in such
analysis.105 Congressional testimony in 2014 by FERC Commissioner
Clark characterized the conflict between proposed environmental
regulation in the CPP to assist climate goals and the pressing counter
requirement to protect power system reliability and resiliency to be “a
jurisdictional train wreck.”106
When the CPP regulation was proposed in 2015, Senator Mitch
McConnell sent a letter to the National Governors Association urging
states to not submit required plans complying with those regulations
once they were promulgated.107 When the proposed CPP rule was
initially challenged at the stage of the proposed regulation, the issue of
final agency action went to the federal circuit court. The federal D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals held that only final agency action is subject to
judicial review:108
Proposed rules meet neither of the two requirements for final agency
action: (i) They are not the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” and (ii) they do not determine “rights or
obligations,” or impose “legal consequences.”109

103. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009). It did not require EPA to employ
cost-benefit analysis, however EPA must provide a reasoned explanation if it should choose
to regulate in a way that would do more harm than good or provide a reasoned explanation
why the agency is indifferent to that outcome. See id.
104. Id. at 223.
105. Id.
106. Garner, supra note 1.
107. Letter from Senator Mitch McConnell to National Governors Association (Mar. 19,
2015),
http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=newsletters&ContentRecord_id=d57e
ba06-0718-4a22-8f59-1e610793a2a3&ContentType_id=9b9b3f28-5479-468a-a86b10c747f4ead7&Group_id=2085dee5-c311-4812-8bea-2dad42782cd4.
108. Murray, 788 F.3d 304. Murray argued that their business would be negatively
affected by the plan, and they had incurred costs in anticipation of the final rulemaking. Id. at
335.
109. Id. at 334-35. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Am. Portland Cement All. v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (“a proposed regulation is still in flux,” so “review is premature”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep’t of Lab., 28 F.3d 162, 165 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (“Agency action is final when it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some
legal relationship,” and an agency’s “proposed rulemaking generates no such consequences.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Consequently, the initial complaint in In re Murray Energy
Corporation was dismissed in June 2015 by the D.C. Circuit because the
EPA rule was not final at that time and administration remedies had not
yet been exhausted, and thus the court lacked the authority to rule on its
legality.110 On the challenge to the final regulation, the Obama
Administration raised procedural defenses to attempt to avoid a decision
on the merits. EPA argued that complainant Murray lacked Article III
standing because Murray was unable to show an individualized injury
from the proposed rule.111 To establish Article III standing, an injury
must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.112
A petitioner who asserts standing based on the expectation of future
injury confronts a more rigorous burden to establish standing.113 Based
on previous case law, EPA stated that additionally, when the petitioner
is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily more difficult
to establish.114 EPA stated that the Court had long held that an
administrative agency’s initiation of rulemaking through a notice and
comment process did not impair the rights of interested parties, so as to
give rise to Article III standing, even if such parties would have been
directly regulated by a final rule.115
EPA also argued that any Murray injury was speculative and did
not confer standing. EPA stated that Murray’s claim was too speculative
to support standing because it was based on predicting the substantive
content of one possible outcome of the rulemaking.116 EPA argued that
the Article III standing cases Murray relied on involved challenges to
final rules promulgated after notice and comment, not proposed rules
published for the purpose of soliciting public comments, or to agency
directives that were not subject to notice-and-comment.117
110. Id. at 334 (“[A] proposed rule is just a proposal. In justiciable cases, this Court has
the authority to review the legality of final agency rules. We do not have authority to review
proposed agency rules.”).
111. Appellate Brief at 9, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (2015) (Nos. 141112, 14-1151), 2015 WL 1022486.
112. Id. at 10; Murray, 788 F.3d 330.
113. Appellate Brief at 10-11, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (2015) (Nos.
14-1112, 14-1151), 2015 WL 1022486.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 12. The EPA stated that at that point in time, when EPA was still evaluating
and had not yet responded to the millions of comments it received, any predictions about what
state specific guidelines EPA might have adopted in a final rule, let alone what requirements
each state, in turn, independently may impose on power plants pursuant to such guidelines,
were pure conjecture. Id. at 13.
117. Id.
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B. The Congressional Review Act
Aside from judicial challenge, there is a revisionary option for the
Congress. The Congressional Review Act (CRA)118 created in the
Congress the discretion and legal ability to unwind recent regulatory
orders or rules. A recent example of this is the Trump Administration
and Congress’ attempts to undo critical accomplishments from the last
months of the Obama administration.119 After a major rule is published
in the Federal Register, it takes effect sixty days later.120 Congress can
disapprove a rule through a joint resolution under the Congressional
Review Act, retroactive to the date the rule became effective.121
The Congressional Review Act allows Congress to amend or
disapprove proposed agency actions by passing a joint resolution after
the executive action becoming final.122 It has almost never been used, as
it would require disapproval by both houses of Congress and either the
signature of the President or an override of a veto by two-thirds of both
houses.123 If a rule proposed by one political administration is rescinded
by the subsequently elected political administration, there must be a
justification why such rescission is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse
of discretion.124
Before any rule covered by the CRA can take effect, the federal
agency that promulgates the rule must submit it to both houses of
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). If
Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving the rule under
118. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801. The Congressional Review Act was
created as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act in 1996, 5 U.S.C.
8. It creates an automatic stay for sixty days for congressional review. Id. If disapproved by
both houses of Congress and signed by the President or approved by the Congress over the
President’s veto, the rule is null and void and there is a prohibition of issuing a similar rule.
Id. Until recently, it had only successfully employed once since enacted in 1996, pertaining
to a Clinton Administration OSHA rule in 2000, overturned during the subsequent Bush
Administration. Id.
119. See Lauren Stephenson, The Little-Known Law Letting Trump Repeal Obama’s
Regulations, NEWSY, Apr. 5, 2017, http://www.newsy.com/stories/trump-usescongressional-review-act-to-repeal-regulations/. Through the CRA, Trump signed eleven
resolutions to repeal prior administration regulations in his first 100 days. President Donald
Trump signed more than a dozen resolutions to overturn rules issued in the last half of 2016
using the Congressional Review Act, an historic number for any president but affecting only
a tiny fraction of the regulations.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 801(f).
122. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808.
123. Stuart Shapiro, The Congressional Review Act, Rarely Used and (Almost Always)
Unsuccessful, THE HILL, Apr. 17, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/lawmakernews/239189-the-congressional-review-act-rarely-used-and-almost-always.
124. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42
(1983).
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procedures provided by the CRA, and it becomes law, the rule cannot
take effect or continue in effect.125 The agency may not reissue either
that rule or any substantially similar one, except under authority of a
subsequently enacted law.126
Procedurally, the CRA protects discretion of Congress. A CRA
motion to consider a disapproval resolution is not debatable and thus it
cannot be filibustered by a minority of Senators.127 Once the Senate
considers the CRA disapproval resolution, the expedited procedure
incorporated in the CRA protects the ability of the Senate to continue
and complete its action, with debate limited to ten hours without any
amendments.128
The CRA does not give Congress any extra authority. Indeed,
Congress can pass legislation whenever it wants to repeal existing
regulations, since those regulations are themselves derivative of earlier
congressional enactments. Instead, what the CRA does is—for a limited
time—suspend much of the deliberative process, including committee
consideration, conference committees to resolve differences between the
two chambers’ respective legislation, and one procedural chokepoint—
the Senate filibuster. A complex “carryover” provision in the CRA
grants it even more reach. This provision enables a new session of
Congress to reach back into the preceding presidential administration’s
term so that it can apply the CRA’s expedited legislative procedures to
rules that were finalized in the last several months of that
administration.129
The CRA creates an accessible legislative tool, valid for a discrete
period, suspending much of the deliberative process otherwise necessary
by the first branch of government to undo a unilateral executive branch
regulation—including committee consideration, conference committees
to resolve differences in decisions between the two legislative chambers’
125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801(f), 802(d).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). For the resolution to become law, the President must sign it or
allow it to become law without his signature. Congress must override a presidential veto. See
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS,
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(4); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
128. See PAUL LARKIN, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT, Mar. 9, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/theconstitution/report/judicial-review-under-the-congressional-review-act. This ensures that the
Senate CRA disapproval resolution will remain substantively identical to the House joint
resolution disapproving the same rule, so that no filibuster is possible on the resolution itself.
Once a motion to proceed is adopted, the CRA resolution becomes “the unfinished business
of the Senate until disposed of,” and a non-debatable motion may be offered to limit the time
for debate. The CRA provides that at the conclusion of debate, the Senate automatically
proceeds to vote on the resolution. Id.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1)(B).
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regarding action on legislation, as well as the procedural ‘chokepoint’ of
the Senate filibuster. If a rule is challenged in court, the executive branch
can postpone the effective date of a rule.130 A postponement by the
executive branch for an indefinite period has effect similar to a new rule
revoking the regulation, which must be done in compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act.131 If a rule proposed by one political
administration is rescinded by the subsequent political administration,
there must be a justification why such rescission is not arbitrary or
capricious or an abuse of discretion.132 The CRA enables a new session
of Congress to “reach back” into the preceding presidential
administration’s term so that it can apply the CRA’s expedited
legislative procedures to negate rules that were finalized in the last
several months of that prior presidential administration.133 So the CRA
function as an expedited tool that allows the first branch of government
to go down its checklist of recently passed regulations and negate on an
expedited, stream-lined basis those of which it disapproves.
There is history to the Congressional Review Act and the CPP. In
the 111th Congress, on December 15, 2009, four identical resolutions
were introduced to disapprove the first of EPA’s GHG rules, the
Endangerment Finding for carbon emissions, which was the necessary
first step to justify regulating CO2 and other carbon emissions as a new
category of pollutants that otherwise are not regulated by the Clean Air
Act.134 Of the four, one proceeded to a vote:135 on June 10, 2010, the
Senate voted forty-seven to fifty-three not to take up the resolution.136
The CRA applies to a “rule.”137 There is no distinction in the CRA
between proposed and final rules.138 Senator McConnell argued that it
130. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705.
131. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77,
at 48.
132. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 4142 (1983).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1)(B).
134. One of these was in the Senate, S. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); three were in the
House, H.R. Res. 66, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2009); and H.R. Res.
77, 111th Cong. (2009).
135. S. Res. 26.
136. See P.L. 107-5 (2001), 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261 (disapproving an OSHA rule on
ergonomics). A motion to disapprove a resolution under the CRA is treated as not debatable,
and it is not subject to delay by filibuster. The CRA does not allow amendments to it, and
limits debate on it to ten hours. See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE,
DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW ACT, (Oct. 10, 2001), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/316e2dc1-fc69-43cc-979adfc24d784c08.pdf.
137. Rules adopt the meaning contained in 5 U.S.C. § 804(3).
138. Section 551 does not directly address the definition of a proposed rule or the
difference between a proposed and final rule, stating that a rule is “the whole or part of an
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should also apply to proposed rules.139 Until the current Congress, the
CRA was only invoked twice in its two decades.140 There is no case law
examining the applicability of the CRA to proposed rules. S.J. Res. 30
was introduced in 2017 with dozens of cosponsors; it disapproved of the
EPA’s CPP proposed rule regarding New Source Performance Standards
for electric generating units that had been published by the Obama
Administration in the Federal Register in 2014141
Proposed in Congress in 2016, and reintroduced in 2017, was the
Separation of Powers Restoration Act to address unbalanced power
favoring the executive branch; it authorizes courts reviewing agency
actions to decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and rules made
by agencies.142 This would change the jurisprudence of administrative
law in the United States. It requires no deference to the agency’s
interpretation regarding all relevant questions of law, thus eliminating
Chevron and Auer,143 referred to as Auer deference in judicial review.144
Introduced in the Congress in 2017 with bipartisan sponsorship in
the U.S. Senate is the Regulatory Accountability Act, which would
require agency regulations to have criteria for cost-benefit and costeffectiveness applied as a prerequisite to promulgation.145 These

agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551. There also is no case
precedent examining the applicability of the CRA to proposed rules. § 805 of the CRA
prohibits judicial review of determinations, findings, actions, or omissions under the act. 5
U.S.C. § 805. Section 802 specifies that the CRA is “an exercise of the rulemaking power of
the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the
rules of each House.” 5 U.S.C. § 802. When requested by members of Congress, the
applicability of the CRA is conducted by GAO, which is required under Section 801 of the
CRA to submit a report on each major rule to the committees of jurisdiction in the House and
Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(2)(A).
139. Letter of Senator Mitch McConnell to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of
the United States (Jan. 16, 2014) http://4cleanair.org/Documents/McConnell-Letter-%20toGAO-1-16-14.pdf.
140. See 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261, P.L. 107-5 (2001) (disapproving of an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration Rule regarding ergonomics).
141. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014).
142. H.R. 76.
143. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1977) (Supreme Court deferred to agency
interpretation of its own existing regulation if the regulation is ambiguous and the
interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, and when initially
provided to court in a brief). There has been subsequent criticism of Auer deference. See Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct 1199, 1212 (2015); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel.
Co. 564 U.S. 50, 59 (2011); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166
(2012).
144. See infra Section IV.B.
145. S. Res. 951, 115th Cong. (2017-2018).
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changes have a “pervasive focus on costs.”146 Under the bill, agencies
would be required to select the best regulatory choice measured by the
monetary analysis based on the best available data.147 Quasiindependent agencies are brought under these limitations: U.S. Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) jurisdiction would extend to the
regulations of the independent quasi-judicial agencies, such as FERC.
Any or all of this would affect executive branch environmental and
energy regulation, going forward.
III. EXECUTIVE BRANCH REGULATION: TRANSITION AND REPEAL
A. Transition in Administrations
CPP allows state plans, which have not yet been submitted to EPA
for the 2028 deadline, to administer CO2 controls “beyond the fence
line”148 of each affected project’s deeded metes and bounds.149 There
was a change in such off-site compliance mechanisms with the change
of administrations. The Trump Administration in the fall of 2017
declared that the CPP was not permissible because the Clean Air Act
requires individual source regulation, rather than regulation “beyond the
fence line” or off-site and away from the emitting pollution source that
is subject to Clean Air Act regulation.150 In other words, individual
source controls must be administered, rather than a generic command to
states to find any way they want to reduce carbon emissions.
Of the three “building blocks” available under the CPP for states to
meet the carbon emission standards, the Trump Administration’s has
emphasized that inside-the-fence measures must be implemented at each

146. See FED’N OF AM. SCIS., EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN AND LIKELY LEGAL
Challenges (Aug. 11, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/epa-clean.pdf; see also William
Buzbee, Regulatory ‘Reform’ that is Anything But, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/regulatory-reform-bills-congresstrump.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-rightregion&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&_r=1.
147. See Buzbee, supra note 146.
148. “Inside the fence” is used to describe pollution control applied to the emission source
itself, such as on the power generation source in its combustion processes or immediate
capture or neutralization of regulated emissions. “Outside the fence” is used to describe
pollution control away from the regulated pollution source, the credits associated with which
are applied or purchased to offset on paper the pollutants emitted by the pollution sources.
This latter mechanism allows pollution credit trading and creates more options for minimizing
emissions.
149. Buzbee, supra note 146.
150. See infra Section III.B.
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power plant emissions source.151 According to the Trump
Administration, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act does not allow
outside-the-fence measures which target other than application of BSER
to the emitting sources that are regulated.152 Such an emphasis on insidethe-fence measures effectively discards two of the three CPP building
blocks of the Obama Administration CPP: Dispatching and running gasfired power plants in lieu of operating coal-fired plants which were
directly CPP-targeted, and shifting generation to wind and solar
plants.153 Incentives for renewable or other technologies do not limit the
actual emissions output of the specifically regulated fossil generation
sources that the Clean Air Act regulates.
Quite apart from the pending, and now long-ongoing, legal
challenges which predated the 2016 Presidential election, the change
from the Obama to the Trump Administrations placed the CPP at nonjudicial risk. Regulations enacted by one executive branch can be
repealed by the next executive branch. EPA promulgated regulations in
2017 to change the value of saving emissions of CO2.154 Executive Order
13783 issued on March 28, 2017, directed EPA to eliminate the CPP.155
Prior to that, the Executive Order 13371 issued on January 30, 2017
directed agencies to eliminate two existing regulations for every one new
regulation issued.156 A lawsuit by the environmental organization
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) alleges that the new Order
exceeds the President’s constitutional authority, violating his duty under

151. EPA, ANPR to Replace Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,507 at 61,512 (Dec. 28,
2017) (Emphasis of application at or to an existing power plant at the regulated source, based
on a physical or operational change to a building, structure, facility, or installation at that
source).
152. Id. at 61,511.
153. Id. at 61,516.
154. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 at 48,037 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/16/2017-22349/repeal-of-carbonpollution-emission-guidelines-for-existing-stationary-sources-electricutility?link_id=19&can_id=c66b4c63149f2740dbf1f9b5fe4fed84&source=email-weeklyactions-5-ways-to-protect-what-matters-to-youmost&email_referrer=&email_subject=weekly-actions-5-ways-to-protect-what-matters-toyou-most. “This approach shifts the focus to the domestic (rather than global) social cost of
carbon, and employs both 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates.” Id. at 48,043.
155. Exec. Order No. 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 35 (Mar. 28, 2017).
156. Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, at
42,751. Executive Order 13771 directs that no agency may issue a new rule unless the agency
offsets the costs of the new rule by rescinding at least two existing ones.
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the “Take Care” Clause of the Constitution,157 and directs federal
agencies to engage in unlawful actions.158
Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, EPA is legally
bound to issue a new, separate, proposed rule any time it wishes to
change or repeal any prior EPA regulation.159 Moreover, the wholesale
removal of a regulation may constitute a “major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” thereby
triggering the need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under
the National Environmental Policy Act.160 Federal circuit courts of
appeal have required on changing regulations:
Changes in course * * * cannot be solely a matter of political winds
and currents. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that the
pivot from one administration’s priorities to those of the next be
accomplished with at least some fidelity to law and legal process.
Otherwise, government becomes a matter of the whim and caprice
of the bureaucracy, and regulated entities will have no assurance that
business planning predicated on today’s rules will not be arbitrarily
upset tomorrow.161

In November 2017, the Trump Administration announced a repeal
of the CPP.162 In the last few days of 2017, EPA issued an Advanced
Notice of a Proposed Rulemaking to Replace the Clean Power Plan.163
The Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) that will accompany the final
repeal when published in 2018, is itself not generally challengeable as to
its costs, benefits, and conclusions, because RIAs are not required by
statute, but only by executive order.164 However, the challengers’
argument in the long-pending litigation against the CPP before the D.C.

157. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
158. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Donald Trump, Civil Action No. 17-253 (RDM) (D.D.C. 2017).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 551; see ABA, RULEMAKING SECTION 553 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/administrative_law/2011/11/2011_fall
_administrativelawconference/rulemaking_chapter_2011.authcheckdam.pdf.
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see EPA, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REVIEW
PROCESS, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process.
161. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. UFW, 703 F.3d 755, 772 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring).
162. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,787 (Nov. 8, 2017).
163. EPA, supra note 151, at 61,507 (To utilize the best system of emission reduction
(BSER) at or to an existing power plant, at the source-specific level, based on a physical or
operational change to a building, structure, facility, or installation.) Id. at 61,512.
164. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER
(Jan. 13, 2017)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf.

1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

A LEGAL “JURISDICTIONAL TRAIN WRECK”

4/15/2019 4:24 PM

25

Circuit claimed alleged flaws in the original Obama Administration EPA
RIA165
B. The Legal Basis of Regulatory Repeal
The Trump Administration EPA in 2017 switched gears and based
its proposed repeal of the CPP not on a change in policy goals, nor on
any of the critical cost considerations, which under the recent Supreme
Court decision in Michigan, could be a basis for reconsideration.166
Rather, EPA in 2017 initiated its still in-progress regulatory repeal of the
CPP based on a legal concern that the Clean Power Plan violated the
Clean Air Act by regulating “outside the fence line” of individual power
plant sources that are subject to the Clean Air Act.167 In taking this step
to resolve its perceived violation, EPA did not repeal its 2009 Clean Air
Act “Endangerment” finding related to greenhouse gases which requires
EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from the power sector consistent with
the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration “Best
System for Emissions Reductions.”168 The Endangerment Finding found
that GHGs endanger public health and welfare, and GHGs from mobile
sources, in the form of motor vehicle engine emissions, contribute to that
endangerment.169
There are options to repeal or to repeal and replace the CPP. If the
Trump Administration EPA does pursue a CPP replacement rule as part
of a “repeal and replace” operation, it would almost certainly focus on a
substitution of conventional inside-the-fence-line measures related to the
power plant subject to NSPS regulation to control CO2 from existing
power plants. Such future inside-the-fence measures would likely focus
on carbon reductions from the actual coal-fired boilers that turn their
electricity generators. This could include upgrading the efficiency of
existing coal-plant boilers to reduce CO2 and other pollutants emitted per
unit of power produced. Previous Obama Administration EPA analyses
found that such upgrades to the efficiency would lead to a roughly four
165. EPA, FACT SHEET: PROPOSAL TO REPEAL THE CLEAN POWER PLAN,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fs-proposed-repeal-cppfinal_oct10.pdf.
166. See infra Section IV.C.
167. EPA, EPA TAKES ANOTHER STEP TO ADVANCE PRESIDENT TRUMP’S AMERICA
FIRST STRATEGY, PROPOSES REPEAL OF CLEAN POWER PLAN, 2 (Oct. 10, 2017)
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumpsamerica-first-strategy-proposes-repeal.
168. See id.
169. See EPA, ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR
GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-findingsgreenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean.
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percent increase in efficiency at coal plants.170 This is in contrast to the
Obama Administration CPP, which encouraged states to undertake
measures outside the power plant fence line that did not affect existing
regulated power plants inside-the-fence.
Estimation of costs and benefits is discretionary in setting dollar
values and is widely varying and controversial depending on the
agency’s assumptions and estimations. Of note, cost considerations still
are front and center in the evolving legal battle. Various provisions of
the Clean Air Act require EPA to weigh both costs and benefits of
regulations. For example, Section 111 directs EPA to establish
performance standards for sources of air pollution that reflect the “best
system” of pollution reduction, “taking into account the cost” of
achieving the standard.171 The CPP would have had its costs exceeding
direct benefits if the Obama Administration EPA had not counted in its
assessment of costs and benefits:172
 “Co-benefits” which the CPP did not expressly or directly
regulate173
 The large amount of assumed international benefits over which the
Clean Air Act has no extraterritorial jurisdiction
 Assumed and counted energy efficiency benefits after the Obama
Administration final CPP rule explicitly dropped them from the
proposed CPP rule as one of four allowed “building blocks” for
state compliance with the CPP GHG reductions

Looking at each of these three issues regarding what benefits are
properly counted in executive rulemaking, the Obama Administration
EPA justified a positive economic balance of the Clean Power Plan
based on counting what have now become challenged benefits. These
included the immediate respiratory health improvements from the “cobenefits” of reduction of criteria pollutant lung irritants along with
unrelated energy efficiency assumptions, and counting international
extraterritorial economic benefits of mitigating climate change.174 The
170. Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, EPA Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon
Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2017.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
172. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015). See also
Congressional Research Service, EPA Regulations: Too Much, Too Little, or On Track?, CRS
Report R41561 Dec., 30, 2016, at 13.
173. See supra Section III.D.
174. See Alejandro Davila Fragoso, Harvard Study Finds $38 Billion Economic Benefit
from EPA’s Carbon Rule, THINK PROGRESS, at 4 (June 9, 2016)
https://thinkprogress.org/harvard-study-finds-38-billion-economic-benefit-from-epascarbon-rule-5448fc324979/. “Research has repeatedly shown that improved air quality is
associated with health benefits such as fewer premature deaths, heart attacks, and
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Obama Administration CPP cost-benefit analysis treated the cost savings
arising from promoting energy efficiency, later expressly dropped by the
Obama Administration from the rule’s final promulgation, as a reduction
of the economic costs of the rule.175 This action offsets the increased cost
associated with more use of renewable energy encouraged by the Plan.176
The “benefit” side of cost-benefit analysis places an estimated dollar
value on non-marketable “public” benefits, including human life, health,
and well-being, aesthetics, recreation, and ecosystem integrity.177
The Obama Administration EPA had previously estimated
substantial benefits resulting from the CPP, including fourteen to thirtyfour billion dollars in benefits accruing just to health, monetizing the
benefits each year of an estimated 3,600 premature deaths, 1,700 heart
attacks, 90,000 asthma attacks, and of 300,000 lost work and school
days.178 EPA estimated the CPP costs at 5.1-8.4 billion dollars per
year.179 The benefits (counting all “co-benefits” and international as
well as domestic benefits from carbon and other controversial and
contested “co-benefit” pollutant reduction) were estimated at thirty-two
to fifty-four billion dollars per year.180
The change in administrations altered cost-benefit calculations.
According to the Trump Administration EPA, the repeal of the CPP is
estimated to save thirty-three billion dollars in avoided compliance costs
in 2030.181 To justify repealing the Clean Power Plan, the Trump
Administration EPA changed the method of assessing costs and benefits.

hospitalizations from respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses.” Id. According to this study,
approximately 3,500 lives could be saved annually with a power plan carbon standard. Id.
175. See Elisabeth Gilmore, On Balance: Teachable Moments in Benefit-Cost Analysis:
From Obama to Trump, SOCIETY OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://benefitcostanalysis.org/balance-teachable-moments-benefit-cost-analysis-obamatrump.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Nathan Hultman, Trump’s Executive Order on Energy Independence, BROOKINGS
INST., Mar. 28, 2017, at 2-3; see AMERICAN LUNG ASS’N, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION
PLEDGES TO FIGHT TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ASSAULT ON CLEAN AIR AND CLIMATE
CHANGE (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.lung.org/about-us/media/press-releases/americanlung-association-pledges-to-fight-trump-assault-on-clean-air.html; see also supra notes 74,
76.
179. See supra note 172. See also, CRS December 2016, supra note 172, at 13.
180. See supra note 172. See also, CRS December 2016, supra note 172, at 13. Other
reporters reported EPA’s calculated benefits as fourteen to thirty-four billion dollars per year;
Hultman, supra note 178. In essence, the EPA set the BSER as different for each state. BSER
is set considering cost. The cost and possibilities for each state would be different depending
on its electric generating technology mix, and estimated time until retirement of each.
Traditionally, the BSER was set as the same for each emitting technology or source.
181. See Gilmore, supra note 175.
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In 2017, EPA no longer counted:
 Climate change mitigation benefits occurring outside the United
States over which EPA has no legal jurisdiction and which the
CPP does not address
 Indirect “co-benefits” that the Plan does not address
 Estimates of avoided generation costs of the Clean Power Plan182

C. The Legal Dimensions of International ‘Benefit’
One needs to address the significance of international borders,
when U.S. law does not extend beyond its borders, but when the benefits
of reduced carbon emissions on warming are international. When all
costs are domestic, and benefits are international, what is the most
appropriate comparison of costs and benefits? First, as to the territorial
issue, these changed assumptions and calculations in 2017 reduce the
assumed CPP climate-change benefits from the Obama EPA prior 20
billion dollars estimate of international benefits, to 3 billion dollars of
benefits only measured within the U.S.183 Thus, eighty-five percent of
the CPP Clean Air Act benefits were counted outside U.S. territory in
which the Clean Air Act exercises jurisdiction. These eighty-five percent
international versus fifteen percent national benefit values are very
controversial regarding what is the proper methodology for the U.S. CPP
calculation.
Environmentalists have argued that international benefits should be
counted in regulatory evaluation.184 They note that carbon reduction
benefits everyone globally, which otherwise would be plagued by
greater warming.185 Some claim that these benefits should be recognized
and counted if they are realized.186 According to then-current EPA
Administrator Scott Pruitt, the proposed repeal is being conducted in a

182. See Ted Gayer, The Social Costs of Carbon, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 28, 2017)
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-social-costs-of-carbon/. Instead of considering
global climate benefits, the Trump administration EPA now only shows domestic benefits.
183. Lorraine Chow, Trump EPA ‘Cooks the Books’ to Hide Benefits of Clean Power
Plan, ECOWATCH, Oct. 11, 2017, https://www.ecowatch.com/epa-clean-power-plan2495501894.html; see EPA, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN BENEFITS OF A CLEANER,
MORE EFFICIENT POWER SECTOR,
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-planbenefits-cleaner-more-efficient-power-sector_.html.
184. Emily Holden, EPA’s Climate Rule Withdrawal Will Include Big Changes to Cost
Calculations, POLITICO, Oct. 5, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/05/epaclimate-rule-withdrawal-cost-calculations-243520.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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‘transparent way,’ with the agency producing an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM).187
Testimony provided by a witness from the Brookings Institution
traced the history of cost and benefit assessment during the recent past,
noting that before the Obama Administration’s Executive Orders, the
practice for the past two decades, as well as the congressionally stated
purpose of the Clean Air Act, was not to consider global benefits and to
focus on domestic benefits exclusively:
I believe that the exclusive focus on a global measure runs counter
to standard benefit–cost practice, in which only the benefits within
the political jurisdiction bearing the cost of the policy are considered.
It also seems at odds with the expressed intent of long-standing
executive orders and of authorizing statutes. For example, the main
regulatory guidance document that has been in place for over 20
years is Executive Order 12866, which makes clear that the
appropriate reference point for analyzing federal regulatory policies
is the U.S citizenry, not the world. And a subsequent guidance
document by the Office of Management and Budget (known as
Circular A-4) maintained an emphasis on domestic benefits.
Similarly, when enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress stated that its
purpose was to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and
productive capacity of its population,” which again suggests a focus
on domestic benefits. Similar language is found in other authorizing
statutes for environmental regulations.188

The Clean Air Act Section 111 was used as the legal predicate for
the CPP.189 EPA initially estimated that the CPP would yield about 30
billion dollars in global climate benefits by 2030.190 Of note, this thirty
billion dollar estimate included only approximately two to seven billion
dollars in domestic benefits, which was less than the estimated domestic
costs of 5.1-8.4 billion dollars per year.191 According to an analysis and
witness from the Brookings Institute:
The difference between global and domestic benefits of greenhouse
gas regulations is significant, as the global measure is 4 to 14 times
greater than the estimated domestic measure. For example, for its
proposed regulations for existing power plants, the EPA estimated
climate benefits amounting to $30 billion in 2030. However, the
187. See id.; See EPA, EPA ADMINISTRATOR PRUITT PROPOSES COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS REFORM (June 7, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administratorpruitt-proposes-cost-benefit-analysis-reform.
188. Gayer, supra note 182, at 2.
189. See supra notes 36, 48, 60.
190. Gayer, supra note 182, at 2.
191. Id.
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estimated domestic climate benefits only amount to $2-$7 billion,
which is less than EPA’s estimated compliance costs for the rule of
$7.3 billion. The use of a global social cost of carbon to estimate
benefits means that agencies will adopt regulations that could cost
Americans more than they receive in climate-related benefits. This
approach could be especially problematic if U.S. actions simply shift
emissions overseas.192

The net cost-effectiveness of the CPP depends on whether one
counts monetized benefits estimated to occur outside the United States
and beyond the reach of U.S. law. Domestic versus international
benefits change the net benefits by a factor of approximately 1000
percent.193 This single modeling choice swings a program that is costjustified globally to one which is not cost-justified domestically.194 For
comparison of international benefits to the geographic location of costs,
all costs of CPP are imposed domestically on U.S. power plants only.
Some have noted that because the CPP does not address
international CO2, the United States has no jurisdiction over what other
nations do or do not do, and because the United States does not pay for
what other nations do, international benefits have no place in a
calculation involving U.S. carbon: “It’s reasonable to count only the
rule’s U.S. benefits since Americans would be paying the costs, said Jeff
Holmstead, an industry lawyer who was EPA’s air administrator under
former President George W. Bush.”195 The Trump EPA reverted to
White House guidance from 2003, which directed regulators performing
cost-benefit analyses to “focus on benefits and costs that accrue to
citizens and residents of the United States.”196 This prior 2003 guidance
stated that international implications should go into a separate report.197
There also is a now developing novel international dimension. The
Obama Administration CPP cost-benefit analysis assumed that there will
be dramatically more solar photovoltaic (PV) panels used to offset
electric generation from existing coal-fired power, a large number of
which s are either made in or compose key elements of the silicon and
other materials produced in China.198 China has significantly subpar
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing a four to fourteen times multiplier, or 400-1400 percent increase in
estimated benefits when counting global benefits instead of domestic benefits).
194. See EPA, supra note 187 (U.S. benefits of two to seven billion dollars are less than
EPA’s estimated compliance costs for the rule of 7.3 billion dollars).
195. Holden, supra note 184, at 4.
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id.
198. Katie Fehrenbacher, China is Utterly and Totally Dominating Solar Panels,
FORTUNE MAG., June 18, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/06/18/china-is-utterly-and-totallydominating-solar-panels/.
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environmental regulations compared to other major economies of the
world.199 None of the environmental repercussions of more made-inChina photovoltaic panels manufacturing are calculated as
environmental costs in the original CPP cost analysis, because those
environmental impacts of Chinese or other developing country
manufacture occur outside of the United States.
In fact, the makers of these Chinese PV panels were recently found
by the International Trade Commission to have violated international
trade laws.200 That panel has recommended the possibility that stiff
import tariffs be imposed on these Chinese photovoltaic panels as a
sanction for unfair trade practices.201 International environmental costs
abroad of manufacture of alternative sources of power generation, which
are thereafter exported to the United States, are not included in the cost
calculation, although they were originally one of the building blocks of
compliance and CPP benefits.202 Although it now looms as a question
on the exercise of executive branch power on cost and benefit
considerations, there is no court precedent on this question of first legal
impression.
D. Are ‘Co-Benefits’ a Legitmate Operand?
Beyond international geography, there is a second issue of whether
it is proper math to count “co-benefits” from pollutant reduction not
regulated by the CPP as benefits of the CPP. Even though the CPP is
targeted at global warming and climate change goals, less than one-tenth
of one percent of the estimated benefits of the CPP are from carbon
reduction and warming mitigation; more than ninety-nine percent of the
benefits are “co-benefits” from estimated reduction of criteria pollutants

199. Jonathan Kaiman, China Strengthens Environmental Laws, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
25,
2014)
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/25/china-strengthensenvironmental-laws-polluting-factories. Even if China creates more environmental
regulations, the problem lies in the implementation of these laws. Id. China is the largest
carbon emitter in the world.
200. Kirsten Korosec, Why Rooftop Solar Might Get A Lot More Expensive in the U.S.,
FORTUNE MAG., Sept. 22, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/09/22/solar-costs-tariffs/. The
International Trade Commission in September 2017 that imports of low-cost solar panels from
China have hurt U.S. manufacturers. The decision gives the Trump Administration the power
to issue steep tariffs on Chinese companies—where the majority are made—cutting off the
flow of cheap panels to installers in the U.S.
201. Id. The claimant, Suniva, requested that solar cells brought into the United States
have a forty-cent tariff, raising the minimum price to seventy-eight cents/watt, which is twothirds more expensive than the cheapest panels on the market.
202. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
ENERGY: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, https://www.oecd.org/futures/17738498.pdf.
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which are not regulated by the CPP.203 Criteria pollutant impact is not
global, but rather a function of geographic proximity of human receptors
to the power plant sources emitting these criteria pollutants.204
The degree of impact on benefits makes the prior
international/national domestic calculus of benefits pale in comparison:
Adding “co-benefits” to the CPP calculation boosts benefits by more
than 10,000 percent.205 Here again, there is a dispute as to whether their
inclusion is appropriate. According to the Congressional Research
Service:
There are recurring questions regarding the methodologies used to
estimate both costs and benefits, including what to choose as the
baseline against which to measure changes resulting from a
regulation; how to monetize improvements in public health, such as
the avoidance of premature death; whether to count both direct
benefits and co-benefits (i.e., benefits achieved that were not the
purpose of the regulation); how to account for benefits for which
there is no accepted measurement or valuation methodology;
whether to include reductions in the “social cost of carbon” as a
benefit and, if so, how to measure those benefits; and whether certain
benefits or costs are double-counted when simultaneous proposals
address the same pollutant.206

Legislation has been introduced by Evan Jenkins, a Republican
Representative from West Virginia, to prohibit EPA and the Department
of Energy from including the social cost of controlling carbon and
methane, greenhouse gases, or ancillary co-benefits of particulate matter
reduction.207 Some states did not agree with the ability or discretion of
EPA to count “co-benefits.” For example, the Director of the Ohio EPA,
in comments to U.S. EPA, stated:
When U.S. EPA promulgates a revised National Ambient Air
Quality Standard (NAAQS) it uses the amount of air quality
improvement as a measure to determine benefits. If a facility installs
controls to meet the NAAQS and also complies with the Utility
MATS, plus Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), U.S. EPA

203. See CRS, supra note 172. The direct CPP direct benefits of mercury reductions were
four to six million dollars, which increased one-thousand-fold when indirect co-benefits were
added to make total benefits of CPP equal to thirty-seven to ninety billion dollars. Id.
204. EPA, EPA CLEAN POWER PLAN, Section IX: Community and Environmental Justice
Considerations, 6 (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.ceed.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CPPSection-IX-Community-and-Environmental-Justice-Considerations.pdf.
205. “Co-benefits” increase from single digit million benefits to double-digit billion
benefits. See supra note 203.
206. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59, at 4 n.16.
207. Transparency and Honesty in Energy Regulations Act of 2017, H.R. 3117, 115 th
Cong. (2017).
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should not double or even triple count those reductions as part of
each rulemaking. The health benefit that U.S. EPA states is occurring
can only occur once, not be recounted multiple times under separate
U.S. EPA rulemakings. 208

A search for EPA court decisions regarding counting of indirect cobenefits or double-counting of benefits produces no precedent. It
remains an issue of first impression. There is a purpose in counting “cobenefits.” The Obama Administration CPP expressly stated that it
sought and intended to achieve its counted “co-benefits” by making it
too expensive or difficult through CPP regulations for existing coal-fired
power plants to continue operation, thereby expressly taking credit for
other criteria pollutant reduction of “co-benefits” that operating coalfired power plants otherwise emit if they continue operating.209 The
Obama Administration EPA added estimated indirect incidental “cobenefits” related to reduction of criteria pollutants which were not
regulated by the CPP rule.210 This altered the otherwise lopsided
outcome of CPP private sector implementation costs far exceeding direct
benefits of its regulated CO2 reduction.211 This fundamentally alters the
outcome of the cost/benefit analysis of the CPP.
The CPP regulation does not regulate or even mention any of these
criteria pollutants whose claimed estimated reduction produces “cobenefits,” even though it does state its motive to constrain operation of
existing and future coal-fired power plants.212 These other criteria
pollutants and hazardous air pollutants yielding “co-benefits” are already
208. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59; see also UTIL. AIR
REGULATORY GRP. (UARG), COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO EPA’S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING
(Jan. 15, 2016) https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR2009-0234-20557&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. “In
order for there to be co-benefits from PM2.5 to attribute to the Proposed Rule, the Proposed
Rule must require more reductions of primary PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursors (e.g., SO2 and NOx)
than would otherwise occur under other existing regulations, including the current National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for PM2.5. To include any co-benefits from
reductions that will occur anyway as a result of the current PM2.5 NAAQS in this rule would
be to double-count those benefits—first as the direct benefits that were counted to justify the
PM2.5 NAAQS in that rule’s 2006 RIA (EPA, 2006), and then again as co-benefits to justify
this Proposed Rule.”
209. See supra notes 56-58.
210. See supra notes 205, 207, 211.
211. See EPA, supra note 187 (U.S. benefits of two to seven billion dollars are less than
EPA’s estimated compliance costs for the rule of 7.3 billion dollars).
212. Id.; See also BRIAN F. MANNIX, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. REGULATORY
STUDIES CTR., PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO
EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW
PROGRAM (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1866/f/downloads/EPAACE-PIC-Mannix-10-30.pdf.

1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

34

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

4/15/2019 4:24 PM

[Vol:59

regulated to statutorily-required levels of “adequate” or “ample” margins
of public health safety, respectively.213 We do not have any Supreme
Court determination about the legal permissibility of a ‘new math’
algorithm counting “co-benefits” as a means for justification of specific
regulations pursuant to administration law, although the Court reached
the “cost” issue in 2015 for the first time on another matter.214
This changed with the change of administrations: The Trump
administration in 2017 no longer considered the indirect CPP ‘cobenefits’ related to chemicals not expressly regulated by the CPP as
monetized benefits to be counted regarding the CPP. Trump’s EPA will
not count those ancillary reductions as ‘co-benefits’ where those criteria
pollutants215 are already regulated by the EPA under other standards in
the Clean Air Act.216 And most areas of the country are in compliance
with the NAAQS required levels for criteria pollutants.217
The Trump Administration counts zero benefits of reducing U.S.
“co-benefits” below the national NAAQS standards for the six criteria
pollutants.218 Critics charge that the scientific community thinks there
would be additional health benefits from reductions beyond those
required by the Clean Air Act.219 However, the Clean Air Act requires
that these NAAQS levels have already been set at levels to “adequately
protect” human health220 in each of the 264 Air Quality Control Districts
(“AQCD”) in the United States.221 There has long been a difference
between what scientists and/or EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee (“CASAC”) state is the best or most protective
recommended NAAQS level, and what EPA, in its judgment,

213. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77,
at figure 5.10.
214. See infra Section IV.C.
215. These include particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, etc. See FERREY,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 189, tbl. 5.1.
216. See Chris Mooney, Even Trump’s EPA says Obama’s Climate Plan Would Save
Thousands of Lives Each Year, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2017)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/01/trumps-epasays-obamas-climate-rule-could-prevent-up-to-4500-deaths-annually-moves-to-scrapit/?utm_term=.0077dfc3c4b0.
217. See EPA, AQCR NAAQS COMPLIANCE.
218. Environmentalists Blast EPA’s Cost-Benefit Review in CPP Repeal Effort, INSIDE
EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Oct. 20, 2017. See also Kimberly Castle and Richard L. Levesz,
Environmental Standards, Thresholds, and the Next Battleground of Climate Change
Regulations, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2019.
219. Id.
220. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at
186-89.
221. Id. at 193.

1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

4/15/2019 4:24 PM

A LEGAL “JURISDICTIONAL TRAIN WRECK”

35

establishes.222 The Trump Administration EPA issued a directive that
no member of EPA advisory committees shall “be currently in receipt of
EPA grants” or be “in a position that otherwise would reap substantial
direct benefit from an EPA grant.”223
While EPA exercises the ultimate legal authority over what it does
in setting Clean Air Act standards, when the EPA’s decision differs from
the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s recommendation
on an emission limit, EPA must provide an explanation.224 One circuit
court found that the CASAC’s prior recommendation to have the
standard “lowered from 0.080 ppm to no greater than 0.070 ppm” due to
“overwhelming scientific evidence” was not a sufficiently clear
statement to bind EPA.225 However, the CASAC must be clear in linking
emission levels to definitive impacts on public health; the Supreme
Court will not overrule EPA decisions without a clear scientific
determination by the CASAC:
Had CASAC reached a scientific conclusion that adverse health
effects were likely to occur at the 0.070 ppm level, EPA’s failure to
justify its uncertainty regarding the existence of adverse health
effects at this level would be unacceptable . . . , [b]ut we were unable
to determine whether CASAC reached any such scientific
conclusion.226

The court of appeals noted the great deference due an
administrative agency in charge of implementing a standard, and
“stressed that the agency had broad leeway in deciding how much of a
scientific margin of safety was sufficient.”227

222. As one recent example, the EPA Clean Air Science Advisory Committee in 2014
recommended that it was necessary to lower the ozone NAAQS to sixty ppb or below, from
its then-current standard of seventy-five ppb, to protect public health and reduce premature
deaths. The Obama Administration EPA in 2015 elected to not follow this advice, and lowered
the standard to seventy ppb. See Patrick Ambrosio, Ozone Standard of 60-70 parts per billion
Appropriate to Protect Health EPA Staff Says, 45 ENV’T REP. 2519 (BNA), Sept. 5, 2014; see
EPA, 2015 REVISION TO 2008 OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
(NAAQS) RELATED DOCUMENTS, https://www.epa.gov/ozone-pollution/2015-revision2008-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs-related.
223. See E. Scott Pruitt, Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Advisory
Committees (Oct. 31, 2017) https://perma.cc/VZM2-VBKQ.
224. See Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (EPA failed in
the final rule to adequately explain its reason for not accepting the CASAC’s
recommendation); see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2012).
225. See Miss. v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
226. Id. at 1357.
227. Steven Ferrey, Courts Cap the ‘Trade’: Regulation of Competitive Markets When
Courts Overturn State and Federal Cap-And-Trade Regulation, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 681, 730
(2014); see Miss. v. EPA, 723 F.3d 246, 254, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2013) amended and superseded
by rehearing, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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One can compare CPP cost-benefit values to all other regulations.
A draft 2016 OMB report to Congress estimates that the annual benefits
from all major regulations over the last ten years were between 208
billion and 627 billion dollars, while their costs were between 57 billion
and 85 billion dollars.228 OMB’s 2005 report to Congress, a decade
earlier, estimated that major rules from the previous ten years provided
benefits of 69.6 billion to 276.8 billion dollars, while costing between
34.8 billion and 39.4 billion dollars.229 The CPP cost-benefit is a closer
call, based on the inputs and assumptions that one makes with regard to
counting ‘co-benefits’ and international benefits.
As this article went to press, the matter of “co-benefits” in all EPA
rulemakings became a major issue: In 2018 EPA released an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to re-examine all cost and benefit
analysis by the agency.230 The notice references the Michigan231 and
Entergy v. Riverkeeper232 Supreme Court decisions as mandating, or
allowing, respectively, consideration of costs by the agency.233 EPA
notes that a comment(s) submitted to the Agency “has justified the
stringency of a standard based on the estimated benefits from reductions
in pollutants not directly regulated by the action (i.e., “ancillary benefits”
or “co-benefits”).”234 This potential new executive agency rulemaking
on this transcendent issue moves the dispute in dimensions.

228. See OMB, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES
REFORM ACT,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/draft
_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf.
229. See OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 1,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/fi
nal_2005_cb_report.pdf.
230. Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the
Rulemaking Process (ANPR, 40 CFR Ch.I) at 6,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201806/documents/cost_and_benefit_consideration_anprm_prepub.pdf?utm_source=Federal+State+Policy+Updates+June+2018&utm_campaign=State+an
d+Federal+Updates&utm_medium=email.
231. See Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
232. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
233. Id.
234. See Maxine Joselow, Clean Air Advocates Worried by EPA’s Move to Rethink CostBenefit Calculations, SCI. MAG. http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/06/clean-airadvocates-worried-epa-s-move-rethink-cost-benefit-calculations.
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IV. LEGAL DISPUTE CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. “Staying” Current Lex
The CPP is in suspended legal animation amid these issues swirling
about it. As soon as the regulation was final, legal challenges to the
Clean Power Plan were filed by more than 100 parties following its
promulgation in October 2015.235 Those twenty-seven states challenging
the EPA CPP rule and the eighteen states supporting it are illustrated in
Figure 2.236 The ongoing and pending legal challenge to the CPP is not
yet through the appellate process nor heard by the Supreme Court,
however, petitioners sought a stay from the D.C. Circuit, which denied
the request.237 The D.C. Circuit denied the stay in 2015 because they
noted that there are extraordinary standards on the issuance of
extraordinary writs.238

235. See id.; See also TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59, at 13.
236. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND
PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA, R44480 (Mar. 8, 2017) at 13, fig. 1,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf.
237. See Gavin Bade, DC Circuit Court Denies Stay on EPA Clean Power Plan, UTILITY
DIVE (Jan. 21, 2016). The three judge panel stated that the parties had not satisfied the
“stringent requirements” necessary for a stay. Id.
238. W. Va. v. EPA, Case No. 15-1277 (Sept. 9, 2015) (citing Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FERC, 777 F.2d 760, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v.
Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Figure 2
The Supreme Court thereafter granted a stay on February 9, 2016, 239
in less than three weeks after it was applied for.240 The Supreme Court’s
dissent on the stay was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan,241 not wanting to stay the CPP during the Obama
Administration. The Court’s order granting the stay applied directly to
EPA’s CPP rule, rather than to a lower court judicial decision on appeal
as it usually does when a lower court decision is on appeal.242 No party
in the matter was able to point to any previous case in which the Supreme
Court had stayed an agency rule before any court had reviewed it on its
239. W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016); see Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court Put the
Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-courtputs-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/?utm_term=.dd512a870f71.
240. The first application for a stay was filed on January 21, 2016; the Court granted the
stay on February 9, 2016. This stay before a court of appeals decision on the merits was
deemed by the Congressional Research Service as “unusual.” CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE,
supra note 236, at 15.
241. W. Va. v. EPA, No. 15A773 (Feb. 9, 2016) (order staying the CPP).
242. Id.
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merits.243 After being reversed by the Supreme Court granting a stay,
the D.C. Circuit found that the Supreme Court stay not only relieved
EPA of its enforcement obligation, but also relieved EPA of its statutory
duty to regulate carbon for the indefinite future.244
Some commentators posit that this was not a surprising outcome,
given the ruling requiring EPA to consider costs before issuing Clean
Air Act regulations, in Michigan.245 Pending subsequent decisions, the
Trump Administration EPA now seeks the D.C. Circuit to delay further
action.246 The Trump Administration argues that given its discretion to
withdraw and repeal the CPP, a court decision on its merits would be
moot.247 Environmental groups have continued to press for a decision
of the D.C. Circuit court that the CPP was, and is, legally promulgated
with executive discretion without Congressional approval.248
Media attention has focused on numeric aspects of the Trump’s
repeal two, enact one regulatory ratio. 249 Not as much noticed, but of
much more legal significance and lasting importance, are what could
become common law permanent changes to what courts will deem legal
versus unpermitted executive action or regulation. Under the radar of
243. See Robert Percival, In Blocking EPA Clean Power Plan, is the Supreme Court
Wading Deeper Into Politics?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 12, 2017),
http://theconversation.com/in-blocking-epa-clean-power-plan-is-the-supreme-court-wadingdeeper-into-politics-54513.
244. W. Va., v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (Aug. 8, 2017) (order determining the effect of the stay
of the CPP).
245. See Adler, supra note 239. As a side note, there was no stay granted to the plaintiffs
in the Supreme Court Michigan decision resulting in power plants paying for later-stricken
upgrades to comply with EPA’s rulemaking during the litigation only to have it overturned by
the Supreme Court for the lack of cost-of-compliance analysis done by EPA for the § 112
regulations. By the time the order was invalidated, the costs were expended and plants were
at, or near compliance with the invalidated rulemaking, as suggested in Petitioners application
for stay.
246. Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir.), motion filed Apr. 18, 2017.
247. See Cogan Schneier, EPA Moves to Kill Clean Power Plan as Lawsuit Languishes in
DC Circuit, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 10, 2017). “Technically, [finalizing the rescission] should moot
the challenges to the Clean Power Plan because, at that point, it wouldn’t exist anymore,’ said
Crowell & Moring partner Thomas Lorenzen, who argued on behalf of the National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association and other involved industry groups.”
248. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, LIST OF SUPPORTERS OF THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN IN COURT,
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/list_of_supporters_of_the_clean_power_plan
_in_court.pdf. Among this list, there are eighteen states listed in addition to Washington D.C.
Id. There are also sixty municipalities, several power companies, high tech companies, leading
consumer brands, advanced energy associations, business associations, and 208 members of
Congress. Id.
249. See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Donald Trump Promises To Eliminate Two Regulations
For Every One Enacted, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2016/11/22/donald-trump-promises-to-eliminatetwo-regulations-for-every-one-enacted/#5ad62b1f4586.
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most observers, President Trump in a single sentence directed all
executive agencies to ensure that the “incremental cost” of all new
regulations is no greater than zero.250
While this may seem ministerial and not as significant as many of
the President’s other tweets, it could alter the future of executive action,
EPA rulemaking, and Chevron deference to executive interpretation of
their own authority and rulemaking. What makes this of high-level
significance, is a decision of the Supreme Court a year before the Trump
election.251 This decision, for the first time in the history of U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, elevated the consideration of costs (and
benefits) as a necessary prerequisite to justify EPA regulation.252 Never
before has the Court required such a quantitative evaluation as a prerequisite hurdle to rulemaking.253 Thus, the last three decades of modern
Chevron deference254 to executive branch and EPA initiatives, is
constrained and perhaps altered longer-term.
The Supreme Court largely upheld EPA’s authority to regulate
greenhouse gases under the agency’s New Source Review (“NSR”)
program.255 There is a series of three recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, culminating in Michigan, when coupled with the ongoing cost
challenge on the Clean Power Plan, which may fundamentally change
U.S. administrative and constitutional law. By injecting, for the first
time as matters of first impression, cost considerations into rulemaking,
we are witnessing a substantial change in the separation of powers and
discretion in American law. The foundation of Chevron256 deference is
altered.
B. Legal “Tailoring”
In 2010, the Obama Administrator implemented its GHG
“Tailoring Rule,” which provided for a phasing in of Clean Air Act Title
V and Prevention of Significant Deterioration/New Source Review
(PSD/NSR) permitting requirements for CO2,257 although taking the
250. See Cheri A. Budzynski, The First Six Months of the Trump Administration: Will
Trump Successfully Deregulate U.S. EPA? LEXOLOGY (July 13, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=287657ec-82cd-4784-98cd-d9edc44a0783.
251. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710 (2015).
252. Id.; See also infra Section IV.C.
253. See infra text accompanying notes 300-07.
254. Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
255. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2457-58 (2014).
256. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
257. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, EPA REGULATION OF
GREENHOUSE GASES: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES AND OPTIONS (Feb. 5, 2015), 7-5700,
R41212; The Clean Air Act does not specifically regulate CO2 emissions. It was held in Mass.
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, that the EPA could choose to regulate CO2 emitted by vehicle engines,
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unusual step that 99.65 percent of the otherwise regulated facilities under
the Clean Air Act would not have to meet the CO2 standard.258 The
“Tailoring Rule” defined which stationary sources would be required to
obtain Clean Air Act permits for GHG emissions.259 The Clean Air Act
imposes on stationary sources of pollution preconstruction permits if
they have the potential to emit more than 100 tons per year (tpy) of any
air pollutant (for some cases, 250 tons per year). EPA declined to impose
this statutory standard on CO2 emissions.260
When the EPA applied these same standards to “any source” of
greenhouse gas emissions at the 250 tpy Clean Air Act thresholds,
several smaller sources, such as “large office and residential buildings,
hotels, large retail establishments, and similar facilities” fell into the
group whose emissions were regulated.261 Applying the Clean Air Act
PSD provision at their specified 250 tpy threshold set in the statute to
the regulation of CO2 emissions would increase the number of covered
sources under just this one program from 280 emitting sources of CO2
proposed by EPA to more than 80,000 sources.262 The EPA’s legal
justification was that this would lead to the “absurd result” of affecting
as many as six million sources of GHG emissions.263
EPA chose only to regulate those sources whose GHG emissions
exceeded 75,000 (for modification) or 100,000 tpy (for new
construction).264 However, the Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant
Deterioration provisions, which provided the congressional authority to
EPA, cover all “major sources” that potentially can emit 100 or 250 tons
of the relevant criteria pollutant annually.265 This disparity of
if it determined that CO2 was a general pollutant that endangered public health. EPA
subsequently so ruled, despite Justice Scalia’s dissent noting that such an interpretation of
what it could regulate in the air would cover “everything airborne, from Frisbees to
flatulence.” Subsequently, the EPA chose to extend this regulation to CO2 emitted by larger
power plants, which are stationary, rather than mobile, sources of pollution.
258. Author’s calculation: EPA claimed that this “tailoring” would reduce the number of
facilities regulated from more than 80,000 with the requirement set at 250 tpy, to 280 with the
threshold raised to 75,000 tpy or 100,000 tpy, or a reduction of 99.65 percent; see also id.
259. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule
(Final Rule) 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010).
260. See id.
261. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427.
262. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
263. “The ‘absurd results’ doctrine, which authorizes agencies to apply statutory
requirements differently than a literal reading would indicate, as necessary to . . . avoid absurd
results. . ..” 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,536 (preamble) (June 3, 2010).
264. 75 Fed. Reg. 31,523.
265. Id. “Facilities seeking to qualify for a PSD permit must, inter alia, comply with
emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each
pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act. Section 7475(a)(4)….The Act neither compels
nor permits EPA to adopt an interpretation of the Act requiring a source to obtain a PSD or
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quantitative value by a factor of 400:1, conflicted with the basic elements
of the Clean Air Act PSD requirements for six criteria air pollutants.266
Challengers argued that GHG regulation was not intended to apply
to Title V of the Act or its PSD requirements without the Congress or
EPA rewriting the statutory provisions of the Clean Air Act.267 A
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court ending its 2014 term, upheld these
EPA rules in part, although this unilateral agency “tailoring” of the
quantitative value was not permissible when the Congress had set a
standard:
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American
economy,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 159, we typically greet
its announcement with a measure of skepticism.268

Where the so-called “tailoring rule” administratively increased the
numeric regulatory threshold by 40,000 percent from 250 tpy to 100,000
tpy, the Supreme Court held:
EPA lacked authority to ‘tailor’ the Act’s unambiguous numerical
thresholds of 100 or 250 tons per year to accommodate its
greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the permitting triggers.
Agencies must always “ ‘ give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.’ ” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665. The power to execute the laws does not
include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to
work in practice.269

The U.S. Supreme Court held that EPA cannot unilaterally exercise
greater than delegated executive authority to rewrite or refashion,
regardless of convenience or the impossibility of following
congressional command, stated within the Clean Air Act: “EPA’s
interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority

Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions”…. “where the term
“air pollutant” appears in the Act’s operative provisions, EPA has routinely given it a
narrower, context-appropriate meaning.” Massachusetts did not invalidate those longstanding
constructions…. Concerns that BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack
controls, is fundamentally unsuited to greenhouse-gas regulation, which is more about energy
use, are not unfounded. UARG v. EPA, No. 12-1146, slip op. at 1-2, 11 (S. Ct. June 23, 2014).
266. Id.; See EPA, CRITERIA AIR POLLUTANTS, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-airpollutants; see supra note 258 (EPA changed threshold from 250 tpy to 100,000 tpy, a 400:1
differential).
267. UARG, slip op. at 12.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 20-24.
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without clear congressional authorization,” where a court should
demand “clear congressional authorization.” 270
The Court concluded that EPA’s interpretation of the Act could not
change or invent quantitative values or change the statutory math, and
invalidated EPA’s “Tailoring Rule” on the grounds that it purported to
amend the statute:
We conclude that EPA’s rewriting of the statutory thresholds was
impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency’s
interpretation of the triggering provisions. An agency has no power
to “tailor” legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting
unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise discretion only in
the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must
always “ ‘ give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.’ ” 271

Courts since the UARG decision, have relied on UARG to prohibit
the EPA and other executive branch agencies from exercising regulatory
authority to change or expand on the plain language of congressional
statutes.272 This legal principle has implications for the ongoing CPP
issue.273 Costs are an issue, their determination is quantitative, and
agencies can no longer “tailor” plain language in a statute.274 The agency
must figure out what can and cannot be counted, and do the math on

270. Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
271. Id. at 21. Justice Scalia wrote that the EPA lacked the authority to change threshold
limits set by Congress, but it may still regulate greenhouse gas emissions provided they were
already regulated for emitting “conventional pollutants.” Nat’l Ass’n. of Home Builders v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843).
EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require best available control technology (BACT) for
greenhouse gases emitted by sources that were otherwise subject to PSD review because of
their emission of conventional pollutants. Those “anyway” sources could only be required to
comply with greenhouse-gas BACT if they emitted more than a de minimis amount of
greenhouse gases. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427.
272. In Conservation Law Fund., Inc. v. Pruitt, 881 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2018), the court
emphasized not extending EPA jurisdiction over previously unregulated sources. This
decision however has not been limited to just environmental law. In U.S. v. Messina, 806 F.3d
55, 67 (2d. Cir. 2015), analyzing the language of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of
1996, the court relied on UARG v. EPA, to declare that plain meaning statutory language did
not require additional inquiry.
273. “To sum up: We hold that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted
the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for stationary sources based on their
greenhouse-gas emission s. Specifically, the Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a
pollutant for purposes of defining a “major emitting facility” (or a “modification” thereof) in
the PSD context or a “major source” in the Title V context. To the extent its regulations
purport to do so, they are invalid. EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as a
“pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” for purposes of requiring BACT for
“anyway” sources.” UARG, slip op. at 29.
274. See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
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costs and benefits accordingly. The UARG ‘tailoring’ opinion rejected
the agency’s primary rationale for deference. 275
C. Required Consideration of Regulatory Costs
1. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards
Mercury regulation of power plant emissions originated before the
Obama Administration, despite its imprint and litigation surrounding it
being associated with the Obama Administration CPP. In 2005, EPA
promulgated regulations establishing a cap-and-trade system to limit
emissions of mercury from coal-fired power plants. Immediately, the
rules were challenged; the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck and
vacated the mercury regulation in 2008.276
EPA thereafter agreed to propose and promulgate Maximum
Achievable Control Technology (MACT) Mercury Air Toxics standards
for mercury emissions before the end of 2011.277 “The final rule sets
standards for all hazardous air pollutants . . . emitted by coal- and oilfired electric generating units . . . with a capacity of 25 megawatts or
greater.”278 Any existing source would have approximately take four
years to comply with the new MATS, and then, under the Clean Air Act,
could be granted an additional year by its state.279
Section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate
hazardous air pollutants from power plants only if it concludes that

275. See Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); “[T]he question a court faces when
confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is . . . whether the agency
has ‘stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.’ Arlington v. FCC, No. 11–1545, slip
op. at 5 (S. Ct. 2013) (emphasis deleted).” Id. at 10 (citing Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863
(May 20, 2013)).
276. N.J. v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 579-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the mercury rule).
277. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). EPA stated that the standards for existing units, promulgated February 16,
2012, could be met by fifty-six percent of coal-and oil-fired electric generating units using
pollution control equipment already installed; the other forty-four percent would be required
to install technology that would reduce uncontrolled mercury and acid gas emissions by about
ninety percent, at an annual cost of 9.6 billion dollars.
278. EPA, BASIC INFORMATION, https://www.epa.gov/mats/basic-information-aboutmercury-and-air-toxics-standards; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,
77 Fed. Reg. 9304. This affects larger coal plants, if coal is greater than ten percent of fuel
input, and the unit is greater than twenty-five Mw capacity, produces electricity for sale, and
supplies more than one-third of its potential output to any utility power distribution system,
unless its annual capacity factor is less than eight percent of rating (i.e. only used for peaking
purposes). See id. at 9309, 9369.
279. Id.
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regulation is “appropriate and necessary.”280 In reaching that conclusion,
EPA stated that cost was irrelevant, and this was found by the Supreme
Court to be beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation and was
‘capricious’ regarding what was “appropriate and necessary.”281 The
new Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS) promulgated by EPA were
estimated to avert up to 11,000 premature deaths, 4,700 heart attacks,
and 130,000 asthma attacks every year.282 However, virtually none of
this was related to what the rule regulated directly.283
Almost all of the value of estimated avoided deaths and monetized
benefits come from the rule’s effect on emissions of particulates, ‘cobenefits,’ rather than from identified reduction of mercury and other air
toxic chemical exposure.284 What made the rule more controversial is
that the co-benefits associated with fine particulate matter (“PM2.5”)
reductions comprised the overwhelming majority of all benefits
attributed to the MATS regulations by EPA.285 PM2.5 is already
otherwise heavily regulated as a criteria pollutant by EPA under other
NAAQS provisions of the Act and regulations.286 EPA designed the rule,
in part, to achieve through executive action PM2.5 emissions reductions
that were in excess of what it could lawfully compel using provisions of
the Act authorizing direct regulation of PM2.5. MATS was specifically
aimed at reducing power plants’ emissions of toxic air pollutants rather
than criteria pollutants, including toxic arsenic, chromium, nickel,
hydrochloric acid and hydrofluoric acid, in addition to mercury.287

280. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
281. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710-11 (2015).
282. EPA, MATS-HEALTHIER AMERICANS (Nov. 2012),
https://www.epa.gov/mats/healthier-americans.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
284. For more in-depth discussion, see supra Section III.D.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
286. 40 C.F.R. Part 50.
287. Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412 (2013). See Reconsideration of
Certain New Source Issues, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,073, (Apr. 24, 2013); EPA, FACT SHEET:
MERCURY
AND
AIR
TOXICS
STANDARDS
FOR
POWER
PLANTS
1,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201511/documents/20111221matssummaryfs.pdf.
Regarding
HAPs,
see
FERREY,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 574. The 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act included the HAPs and “Good Neighbor” provisions, which
provided the statutory authority for EPA to implement MATS and CSAPR, respectively.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 549, 104 Stat. 2399; National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9425-28 (Feb. 16, 2012); Federal
Implementation Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216 (Aug. 8, 2011). The 1999 amendments
revised the NSPS provision which authorized EPA to apply MATS to new coal- and oil-fired
power plants. Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act of
1999, 106 Pub. L. No. 40, 113 Stat. 207; Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
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In both motive and its calculus, this closely parallels the ongoing
CPP battle:
 It was designed economically to discourage operation of coal-fired
power plants
 It was not cost-effective unless unregulated criteria pollutant ‘cobenefits’ were counted
 Indirect, unregulated ‘co-benefits’ comprised the vast majority of
benefits to make the regulation cost-beneficial

2. Legal Challenge
Numerous parties petitioned the courts for review of the MATS
mercury and air toxics rule, contending that EPA failed to conduct a costbenefit analysis or cost consideration in its initial determination that
control of air toxics from electric power plants was “appropriate and
necessary,” and moreover, alleged that the agency’s later cost-benefit
analysis demonstrated that the rule’s direct benefits failed this test.288 A
circuit court reviews a challenged agency actions pursuant to §
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, under an “arbitrary
[and] capricious” standard.289 The Act requires federal agencies to
consider on the record public comments to proposed rules.290 In a
different energy rule challenge, the D.C. Circuit construed whether it
was arbitrary and capricious when FERC did not respond to the
petitioner’s objections to a rule or order.291 The court held that the
agency’s decision must answer and address seemingly legitimate
comments and objections to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act
standard,292 and the agency decision was arbitrary and capricious once
the agency failed to address an affected party’s objections.293
When challenged regarding the MATS rule, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the action was not arbitrary and capricious because
EPA demonstrated a reasonable connection between its actions and the
record of decision, and it was accorded Chevron deference.294 A
288. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59, at 19.
289. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court shall. . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . .”).
290. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at
47.
291. PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 419 F.3d 1194,
1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1200.
294. U.S. CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., STALLION ENERGY CENTER LLC, ET AL. V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/whitestallion-energy-center-llc-et-al-v-environmental-protection-agency-epa-12-1100.
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dissenting opinion agreed with the industry petitioners that
EPA unreasonably excluded cost considerations and economic impacts
when determining whether MACT regulation of power plant hazardous
air pollutants (HAPs) is “appropriate and necessary.”295 The NAAQS
provisions specifically do not provide for cost considerations.296 By
contrast, for MACT regulation of power plant HAPs as relevant with
MATS, pursuant to §112(n)(1)(A), has more flexible language on
“appropriate and necessary” regulation.297
When the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards applying to
existing coal-and oil-fired electric generating units, it relied in part upon
Supreme Court precedent establishing that EPA is under no obligation
to consider costs in establishing NAAQS under other provisions of the
Clean Air Act that similarly fail to mention cost as a relevant
consideration.298 On that issue the court split, but the majority deferred
to EPA’s technical judgment.299
The matter proceeded on appeal to the Supreme Court by a coalition
of more than twenty states.300 During oral arguments members of the
Supreme Court were critical of EPA cost-benefit analysis which
attributed billions of dollars in annual public health co-benefits to
reduction of fine particulate matter and other pollutants regulated under
other sections of the Clean Air Act other than the MATS mercury
295. The dissent by Judge Kavanaugh believed that the majority over-read the ruling in
Whitman, by ignoring the important difference between how the Clean Air Act provisions
govern NAAQS rulemaking and the MACT regulation of power plant HAPs. Whitman stated
that the EPA may not take costs into consideration when setting national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS). Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc., 175 F.3d 1027 (2001); 5 U.S.C.
§§ 108(a), 109(b).
296. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7408(a); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409(b)(1). What this means is that if an air
pollutant is emitted by “numerous or diverse mobile stationary sources and the associated air
pollutant is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, then pursuant to §
108(a), the EPA must establish NAAQS for those pollutants, and pursuant to § 109(b), those
standards must be “requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety.”
297. 42 U.S.C. § 7421(n)(1)(A). This requires the EPA to study and issue a report on the
public health hazards anticipated to occur as a result of power plant HAP emissions, and then
apply MACT regulation “if” the Administrator finds such regulation is “appropriate and
necessary,” which are not defined.
298. White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, No. 12-1100, 748 F.3d. 1222 (D.C. Cir.,
Apr. 15, 2014). A total of thirty petitions for review, including petitions brought by twentyfour states, were filed in the D.C. Circuit matter.
299. This included challenges to EPA’s determination of what was achievable by the best
performing twelve percent of sources (i.e., the “MACT floor”) and the supporting data. Id. at
1250-1251.
300. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2699-2704 (2015). The court granted certiorari to
and consolidated three separate petitions filed by the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the
National Mining Association and twenty-one states. Fifteen states supported EPA’s MATS
regulation before the Court.
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standards.301 EPA could only quantify four to six million dollars in
benefits to reductions of hazardous air pollutants, a fraction of one
percent of the EPA-claimed long-term benefits of thirty-seven to ninety
billion dollars annually; EPA provided no statistical basis or medical
proof.302 Chief Justice Roberts called it an “end-run” around the
statutory language which “raises the red flag” regarding counting as
much as ninety billion dollars of benefits under the MATS rule from
reductions of pollutants that are regulated under other sections of the
Clean Air Act.303 The Supreme Court thereafter overturned MATS
because:
EPA must consider cost—including cost of compliance—before
deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary . . . . One
would not say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to
impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few
dollars in health or environmental benefits.304

The majority in Michigan stated that “no regulation is ‘appropriate’
if it does significantly more harm than good.”305 Quoting Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Riverkeeper, the majority further
reasoned that:
Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when
deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the
understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying
attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of agency
decisions. It also reflects the reality that “too much wasteful
expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably
fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps
more serious) problems.” Against the backdrop of this established
administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an
administrative agency to determine whether “regulation is
appropriate and necessary” as an invitation to ignore cost.306

301. See Patrick Ambrosio, High Court Appears Split on EPA Decision Not to Consider
Cost of Mercury Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA, https://www.bna.com/high-court-appearsn17179924569/. During oral argument, Justice Antonin Scalia described EPA as an
“outrageously expensive” agency action where the cost vastly exceeds the benefit as a “classic
arbitrary and capricious” act, “I would think that’s a violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, even without the word ‘appropriate’” Id. Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the EPA
“deliberately tied its hands” where “agencies usually like to maintain for themselves as much
discretion as they can;” “It’s a very important principle of administrative law that we will only
uphold a rule based on the arguments that were considered and addressed by the agency.” Id.
302. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
303. See Ambrosio, supra note 301.
304. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707, 2711-12.
305. Id. at 2707.
306. Id. at 2707-08.
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There is no prior precedent on this benefit-accounting issue. The
Michigan Supreme Court decision did not dictate the future EPA choice
of cost analysis.307 However the agency chooses it, its methodology still
can be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the “hard-look” doctrine
established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.308 This
decision was roundly criticized by former Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens, who noted its truncation of his decision for deference in
Chevron:
Ignoring dictionary definitions of the adjective “appropriate” (which
do not mention the word “costs”) and the fact that the word
“necessary” might well impose a duty to regulate even if costs were
excessive, the Court held that the EPA’s initial decision to regulate
was defective because it had failed to include any reference to the
costs of regulation. Instead of simply accepting the plain meaning of
a Congressional command or deferring to the agency’s reasonable
interpretation of a statute that it administers—as Chevron requires—
the Court invalidated regulations that took years to draft… As a
former English major in college, and as the author of the majority
opinion in Chevron, I find that conclusion truly mind-boggling. Such
a free-wheeling statutory decision can do even more harm—both to
the public health and to the Court itself—than misinterpretations of
the Constitution.309

Where Chevron does not apply, courts apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review.310 If Chevron deference does not apply
to a particular agency action, then under the Supreme Court Skidmore
decision, while not controlling upon the courts, this presumptively
causes the body of agency experience and informed judgment to serve
as a guide for the court.311 An agency is not afforded any deference to
its position where it makes a determination that is not embodied in a
regulation.312 Deference is only afforded to an agency interpretation
where “it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”313
There is general judicial deference to the substance of
administrative rules if it turns on disputed issues of technical fact or

307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 2711-12.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
John Paul Stevens Speech, supra note 20.
See Volpe, 401 U.S. 402; see also FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES &
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 69-73.
311. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
312. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
313. Id. at 227.
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policy, or if the statute does not precisely answer the question the rule
addresses, as in Chevron. Interpretive rules that are not rulemakings and
do not enjoy the strong deference accorded legislative rulemaking by an
agency, but still enjoy an initial presumption of (Skidmore) deference.314
In some cases, courts will strike interpretive rules made by an
agency on the ground that the rules were in fact legislative rules that
require a full notice and comment, under formal or informal
rulemaking.315 While distinguishing between legislative and interpretive
rules thus is critical, there is little agreement among the courts on this
distinction. Where mathematical or technical standards are imposed, or
a new duty is imposed on a party by the rule, this typically requires the
formal requisites of APA notice and comment.316
Justice Antonin Scalia noted in Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations that the statutory language is “absolute.”317 The Supreme
Court in United States v. Mead Corp. acknowledged that Chevron
recognizes that Congress can be found to have implicitly delegated
discretionary authority to an administrative agency.318 In City of
Arlington v. FCC, the majority held that Chevron deference applies to
an agency’s interpretation of the scope of its own statutory jurisdiction:
“statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency.” 319 The
Supreme Court held that federal agencies are entitled to deference to
agency discretion in devising regulations, as per Chevron.320 This
overruled a determination that federal rules did not defer sufficiently to
state implementation.321 However, there were other precursors of this
314. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Christiensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (An
agency’s interpretive rule concerning a regulation is given stronger deference by the court,
than an interpretive rule concerning a statute); Mead, 533 U.S. at 221.
315. Id.
316. Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding
EPA rulemaking under Section 3004 of RCRA arbitrary and capricious where the agency
relied on an analytical model that they knew was flawed and not an accurate predictor).
317. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465. Justice Scalia, reflecting on the proper role of the
judiciary, wrote that the statute “unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQSsetting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA.” Id. at 471.
318. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
319. Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). The Court noted that, under
Chevron, the Court must first ask whether Congress directly spoke to the precise question at
issue; if so, the Court must give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent, and if
“the statute is silent or ambiguous,” the court must defer to the administering agency’s
construction of the statute so long as it is permissible. Id. (quoting Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). See also AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397
(1999).
320. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1609-10 (2014).
321. Id. While employing a different mechanism than CAIR to address cross-state
pollution, the D.C. Circuit found that it required some states to reduce emissions by more than
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Chevron retreat. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Arlington
v. FCC warned about “the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state.”322
The Clean Air Act also provides no detailed guidance as to where
the cost line lies or how it should be calculated. The Act’s Section 112
does not require that HAP emission control costs can be compared with
benefits of reduced HAP toxic pollutants.323 The Michigan Court noted
that costs include the upfront cost of implementation, but also include
the cost of compliance with the rulemaking. 324 If challengers can
successfully categorize reduced revenues from fewer generation hours
of operation of a facility as costs of complying with the regulation,
EPA’s rulemaking could be deemed as not benefit-positive and
unreasonable.
Citing King v. Burwell,325 the challengers submitted that the EPA
would require explicit authority from Congress to regulate an area in
which it does not regularly participate (e.g. electricity generation) or to
implement aggressive measures to reorganize how power is generated
and sold in America.326 In King, the court held that the Internal Revenue
Service would not be granted Chevron deference because the Internal
Revenue Service IRS) does not have expertise in crafting health
insurance policies; Congress would have to grant express authority to
the agency.327

what they contributed to downwind state pollution. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d 7,
25 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). Fifteen states sought review of CSAPR,
while nine states intervened to support the rule. Id. at 9-10.
322. Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Robert, C.J., dissenting).
323. 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
324. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must consider cost—including, most
importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation of power plants under
the Clean Air Act is appropriate and necessary. See Clean Air Act, § 112(n)(1)(A), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A). Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
325. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
326. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Petitioner at 5, King, 135 S.
Ct. 2480 (No. 14–114); see also Brief of 166 State & Local Bus. Ass’ns as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 25-26, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14–114) (citing FPC v. S. Cal.
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964)).
327. “When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step
framework announced in Chevron. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is
ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This approach is
premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may
be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such implicit delegation.”
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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3. Next Steps
Similar arguments were expressed by others opposing the MATS
rule based on EPA’s alleged double-counting of benefits. The EPA’s
reliance on the benefits from these massive criteria pollutant reductions,
which occurred due to implementation of the NAAQS program to justify
MATS, could be viewed as double- or triple-counting of benefits.328
EPA admitted that the majority of the total benefits are due to reduction
of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, which as criteria pollutants
rather than hazardous pollutants, are subject to “stringent” regulations
under the separate NAAQS.329
A remaining issues is where PM2.5 is reduced below its NAAQS
standards, which already provide an “adequate margin of safety” to
human health, whether counting additional reductions in PM 2.5 occurring
in already-NAAQS-compliant areas is a countable benefit from a MATS
rule unrelated to PM2.5 ?330 This matter and its issues bear a close
resemblance to the Clean Power Plan dispute,331 also counting a very
large amount of co-benefits from reduction of other than the regulation’s
targeted emissions CO2, and counting many international climate
benefits which were eighty-five percent of total benefits in proportion to
relatively limited domestic climate benefits, evaluated against
substantial future 100 percent domestic compliance costs.332

328. Comments of the National Mining Association on Supplemental Finding That It Is
Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal-and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generation Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,025 (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-023420531&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
329. Id.
330. SUSAN E. DUDLEY, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. REGULATORY STUDIES CTR.,
PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S PROPOSED
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY TO REGULATE
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM COAL AND OIL FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM
GENERATING UNITS (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-023420527&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf; see also MATS
RIA Final, page 224. “Approximately 11% of the avoided premature deaths occur at or above
an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 µg/m3 (the LML of the Laden et al. 2006 study), and about
73% occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 7.5 µg/m3 (the LML of the Pope et. al.
2002 study). As we model avoided premature deaths among populations exposed to levels of
PM2.5 that are successively lower than the LML of each study our confidence in the results
diminishes.” See also http://www.iseepi.org/Docs/PM2.5_LettertoEPA__posting.pdf. The
International Society for Environmental Epidemiology (ISEE) responding to the EPA’s
invitation for comments on NAAQS standards update, recommends to reduce annual PM2.5 to
the level of ten µg/m3 as recommended by WHO’s assessment that “adverse effects on health
cannot be entirely ruled out even below that level.” See also MATS RIA Final, fig. 5-15.
331. See Section III.C.
332. See supra note 184.
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While the Michigan Court suggested that agencies should
generally consider costs in regulatory decision-making, it also made
clear that “it will be up to the agency to decide . . . how to account for
cost.”333 In Michigan, both the majority and the dissent took pains to
make clear that they were not requiring agencies “to conduct a formal
cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is
assigned a monetary value.”334 However, they had to reasonably
consider costs.335 The ultimate question remains whether a regulation is
reasonable if its actual targeted costs dramatically exceed the benefits of
the rule. Fifteen states—Michigan, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—sued EPA
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia again in 2016, for
re-affirming its originally Supreme Court remanded MATS rule.336
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court scrutinize deference
to the executive branch. In UARG v. EPA, the Supreme Court
highlighted that where a statutory interpretation by EPA “would bring
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory
authority,” a court should demand prior “clear congressional
authorization.”337 The challengers to the CPP regulation relied on this
language from UARG and King v. Burwell to argue in their brief:
EPA…purports to have discovered sweeping authority in Section
111(d) of the Clean Air Act — a provision that has been used only
five times 147 in 45 years—to issue a “Power Plan” that forces States
to fundamentally alter electricity generation throughout the country.
But as the Supreme Court recently said, courts should “greet … with
a measure of skepticism” claims by EPA to have “discover[ed] in a
long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant
portion of the American economy” and make “decisions of vast
economic and political significance,” [UARG], especially in areas
outside an agency’s “expertise,”338

The MATS rule is now languishing in the United States Court of
Appeals of District of Columbia, as is the CPP challenge. What both
EPA regulations of MATS and CPP share in common is that in neither
333. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2702.
334. Id. at 2711.
335. Id.
336. See Mich. v. EPA, Petition for Review Case No. 16-1204 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 2016)
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Michigan_Attorney_General_Bill
_Schuette_v_US_Environmental_Protec?1469159801.
337. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2013).
338. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, 23-35, 66, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14–114);
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
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case had the executive branch calculated or created a record of the costs
and benefits of the rules. In each case, the costs were billions of dollars
annually imposed not on the government, but on private stakeholders.
In neither case, had the executive branch regulations been mandated or
vetted by Congress. And in each case, the reduction of the pollutant
(mercury in the MATs rule and CO2 in the CPP, respectively) created a
miniscule amount of direct public health benefits scaled against much
more significant costs for private industry to implement the
reductions.339
In both cases, to alter the lopsided outcome of costs far exceeding
direct benefits of the pollutant specifically regulated by the rule
promulgated by the agency, EPA added estimated indirect incidental
“co-benefits” related to reduction of pollutants which were not regulated
by the rule. This method of counting of so-called “co-benefits” is
additive to the benefits side to the significant extent to flip the outcome
of the cost/benefit analysis from negative to positive. Soon after its 2015
Michigan decision injecting costs into administrative law as a new
prudential requirement,340 the Supreme Court took the rare step of
staying enforcement of the EPA regulation which was the foundation of
the Obama Administration’s climate change policy, more than two years
before a challenge to the regulation could even reach it.341
We are seeing a tectonic shift in the administrative state. After the
Michigan remand of regulations affecting coal-fired power plants, the
Supreme Court took the rare step of staying enforcement of a second
regulation, CPP affecting coal-fired power plants, which had similar cost
issues, more than two years before a CPP challenge could even reach
it.342 This alteration in the powers of the executive branch comes into
even more sharp focus now that the new Trump Administration is
stretching the contours of unilateral executive action. Can an Executive
agency any longer add estimated indirect incidental “co-benefits” not
covered by what a rule regulates or addresses, to flip the apparent costeffectiveness and impact assessment of a proposed rule? This calculus
will alter the twenty-first century regulated state under evolving
jurisprudence.
What both stricken (MATs, the Michigan precedent) and stayed
(the Clean Power Plan, Virginia/Murray stay) regulations shared in
common is that in neither case had the executive branch calculated or
created a sufficient record of the costs and benefits of the rules. In each
339.
340.
341.
342.

See supra Section IV.D & III.C.
Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2726.
See W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
Id.
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case, the costs were billions of dollars annually imposed on private
stakeholders, not the government. And in each case, the reduction of the
pollutant (mercury and CO2, respectively) created a miniscule amount of
direct public health benefits scaled against much more significant costs
for private industry to implement the reductions.
The applications for a stay and granting it relied heavily on
Michigan v. EPA,343 and UARG v. EPA.344 The stay of the Clean Power
Plan reflects the progressive retreat from Chevron deference afforded to
agency decisions, incorporated in UARG v. EPA,345 King v. Burwell,346
and Michigan v. EPA.347 These cases shift the balance of power to
construe Congressional statutes from the executive branch to the courts.
V. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: IMPACT OF CPP STAY OR REPEAL
Some are now noting that the thirty-two percent reduction the
Obama Administration CPP was designed to achieve between 20222030 for CO2 reductions, in fact, was and is occurring anyway more than
five years before the CPP would have started to exert any effect.348 A
recent analysis by the Rhodium Group estimated that United States
electricity emissions are currently on track to fall twenty-seven to thirtyfive percent below baseline 2005 levels by 2030, even if the CPP
regulation is repealed.349 This is approximately in the range of what the
thirty-two percent reduction that the Clean Power Plan originally sought
to mandate.350 In Virginia, a state with a large amount of coal-fired
power generation, between 2000-2014, without the CPP in place during
those fifteen years, the state reduced power plant CO2 emissions by thirty
percent.351 Achieving only half that amount of additional reductions in
the remaining sixteen years from 2014-2030 would meet the CPP
requirements.352
343. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
344. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427. The application of the twenty-nine states for a stay referred
to and relied on UARG v. EPA throughout.
345. Id. at 2444 (disfavoring new agency interpretation).
346. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (disregarding opinion of nonexpert agencies).
347. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (prerequisite de novo agency consideration of costs
before regulation).
348. John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, What the CPP Would Have Done, RHODIUM GRP.
(Oct. 9, 2017), http://rhg.com/notes/what-the-cpp-would-have-done.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. VIRGINIA DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNOR’S ORDER
57 WORKGROUP, VIRGINIA’S CARBON REDUCTION EFFORTS (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://www.naturalresources.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/secretary-of-naturalresources/pdf/deq-eo-57-presentation.pdf.
352. Id.
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CPP is not responsible for any CO2 reductions during the Obama
Administration, since it was not promulgated until 2015 and requires no
reductions until 2022, well after the current four-year term of the Trump
Administration.353 The CPP would require nothing until its first
requirements beginning in 2022, assuming that it is not delayed by
litigation, which is currently occurring.354 The final CPP rule was
released in 2015, with its numbers based on 2014 energy market
projections.355 In the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) released that year,
the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) projected only modest recovery in power sector
CO2 emissions from 2012 lows to eight percent below 2005 levels by
2030.356 If the U.S. is on track to achieve a thirty-two percent reduction
from 2005 CO2 levels, it has been achieving this in the past decade
without a federal CPP or MATs regulations.
The Rhodium Group consultants’ projections estimate that power
sector CO2 emissions would achieve twenty-seven to thirty-five percent
reductions below 2005 levels even without the CPP or any element of it
legally in force.357 This forecast is based on lower cost electricity supply
due to greater supply of natural gas from hydro-fracking technology
which supply suppresses price, more aggressive lower-cost renewable
energy development, and flatter demand for electric power than the U.S.
Department of Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicted:
Gas prices have stayed lower for longer than EIA predicted,
electricity demand has remained flat, rapidly declining wind and
solar costs and a multi-year extension of the PTC and ITC have
driven aggressive renewable energy deployment, and many coalfired power plants have been retired.358

353. See supra Section II.A.1.
354. See Jonathan H. Adler, Placing the Clean Power Plan in Context, WASHINGTON
POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/02/10/placing-the-clean-power-plan-incontext/?utm_term=.f4b07aaf7e5d.
355. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 348.
356. See id. at fig. 3. The CPP was projected to reduce power sector CO2 emissions thirtytwo percent below 2005 levels by 2030.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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The Rhodium analysis illustrates that the U.S. could achieve the
2032 CPP-required levels of CO2 reduction from power plants a full
decade in advance of that deadline from operating economic forces even
without the CPP ever in force.359 The U.S. could achieve the CPP 2032
carbon reduction goal by 2020 and maintain this level to 2032.360 By
this forecast of trends, the power sector carbon reduction objective is
being achieved by basic economic forces, notwithstanding CPP
regulation and the legal controversy surrounding it.

Figure 3. Current Power Sector CO2 Projections and EPA CPP
Target361
Under the CPP, states would have had the option to allow power
plants to trade compliance credits with power generation plants in other
states.362 The CPP allows states to trade compliance credits and
therefrom to claim or achieve CO2 reduction compliance without a state
itself reducing CO2 emissions at all or to the degree required.363 Surplus
credits could be purchased by facilities in another state to show, paper
“compliance” without reducing emissions inside the fence line of that
state’s power generation facilities.364 Rhodium’s study assumed that all
states took advantage of trading to minimize costs where credit
purchases were less expensive than actual in-state reductions, whereby
the CPP in fact would have achieved no additional emission reductions
in the future compared to business-as-usual, assuming that natural gas
359. Id.
360. Id. See also Figure 3.
361. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 348.
362. Id.
363. FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN OVERVIEW, supra note 34.
364. See Emily Holden & Elizabeth Harball, EPA Clean Power Plan: Start Trading
Carbon, Please, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug. 5, 2015),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/epa-clean-power-plan-start-trading-carbonplease/.
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remains cheap and renewable energy costs decline rapidly, as both have
in recent years.365 This business-as-usual scenario without CPP would
realize zero to seventy-two million metric tons a year of carbon reduction
with credit trading and more expensive gas and renewables during the
2022-2030 CPP compliance period.366 With the highest renewable
energy and natural gas prices analyzed by Rhodium, twenty-one states
would have had to take additional action to comply with the CPP than
what they were already on track to achieve in the absence of the CPP
rule.367
Therefore, it is possible that the U.S. will achieve the CPP
requirements and the Paris Accord international targets without the CPP
in law and a decade ahead of schedule, based only on existing market
forces and changes in power technology. If so, all of the assumed
benefits would be achieved without incurring the regulatory costs. Time,
over the next decade, will tell.
The Supreme Court in several decisions recently circumscribed
court deference to administrative agency decisions. Citing King v.
Burwell, the states maintained that an agency would require explicit
authority from Congress to regulate in an area in which it does not
regularly participate.368 This Court stated that the retreat from Chevron
agency deference is to be applied to matters of great “economic and
political significance,” according to Chief Justice Robert in King.369
By analogy here, the CPP, an environmental regulation, elects to
accomplish its CO2 emission reductions by aggressive measures to
reorganize how power is generated and sold in America. This raises the
issue whether such discretion to influence electricity production is
within the authority of EPA without any separate Congressional
authority or delegation, or whether such authority over electricity
production resides within FERC and the U.S. Department of Energy to
exercise. FERC Commissioner Clark in Congressional testimony
described the CPP and related EPA initiatives, from the perspective of
the electric energy sector which FERC alone regulates in the United
States, as a “jurisdictional train wreck.”370

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See Larsen & Herndon, supra note 348.
Id. See Figure 3.
Id.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015).
Id. at 2483.
Garner, supra note 1.
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VI. TECHNOLOGY CHANGE INTERFACES WITH LAW
A. The Future for Coal
The ongoing legal contest regarding the CPP presages the recent
controversy on the use of coal to power the U.S. economy which was
elevated to a major issue in the most recent presidential election.371 Yet,
even before the future jobs of coal miners became a litmus issue in the
2016 presidential contest,372 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
a significant Executive branch regulation because the agency failed to
consider the costs that the regulation imposed on the U.S. economy. 373
The Obama Administration expressly declared that the CPP and MATs
regulations were designed to frustrate ongoing and future use of coal in
the United States for electric power generation.374
EPA’s CPP rule states that the “book life” of a coal plant is forty
years, and that states, in their compliance filings, should consider not
allowing operation of older coal plants under this rule.375 EPA utilized
a planning assumption which recommends that states and regional ISOs
take natural gas combustion turbines, which were running only at a
national forty to fifty percent operating capacity factor compared to their
full potential, and increase those to a seventy-five percent operating
capacity factor to displace coal-fired power, well within their ninety-one
percent availability.376
The U.S. electric system traditionally has used coal-fired resources
as its principal prime mover power generation technology since the first
harnessing of electricity in the United States 135 years ago.377 There are
400 U.S. coal-fired powered plants378 which traditionally supplied more
than half of U.S. electric power.379 In nineteen of the fifty U.S. states,
371. See Tim Boersma, Charles K. Ebinger, & Heather Greenley, The Presidential
Candidates’ Views on Energy and Climate, BROOKINGS (June 9, 2016)
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/06/09/the-presidential-candidatesviews-on-energy-and-climate/.
372. See Nicolas Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Climate
Regulations: A Primer, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/environment/report/themany-problems-the-epas-clean-power-plan-and-climate-regulations-primer.
373. See id.
374. See supra at notes 56-58.
375. 80 Fed. Reg. 64661, 64872.
376. Id. at 64,799-64,801.
377. See JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF COAL 13 (3d ed.
2013); see also supra Figure 2.
378. John Myskens, Dan Keating, & Samuel Granados, Mapping How the United States
Generates its Electricity, WASHINGTON POST (July 31, 2015) [hereinafter Myskens et al.,
Mapping], http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/power-plants/.
379. See id.; See also Joby Warrick, White House Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon
Pollution,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Aug.
1,
2015),
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coal is the dominant source of electricity, and in thirteen of these
nineteen states, coal supplies a majority of power generation.380
With or without court endorsement and deference to the Obama
Administration’s initiatives culminating in the CPP, the zenith of coal
use in the U.S. is ebbing under current economic condition: Coal for
power generation has been rapidly decreasing in the most recent decade,
to where it now supplies barely one-third of U.S. electric power, with its
share continuing to decrease.381 There has been a dramatic exodus of
coal: In 2012 there were 1,308 coal-fired generating units in the United
States, totaling 310 Gigawatts (Gw) of capacity, of which 10.2 Gw of
coal-fired capacity retired in 2012, and more each year since.382 Sixty
Gw of existing coal-fired power generation capacity are estimated to be
shuttered between 2015 and 2020, with ninety percent of this coal
decrease having occurred by 2016.383 U.S. coal-fired generating
capacity is projected to decrease to 262 Gw in 2040, which would
constitute a fifteen percent decrease, according to the U.S. Energy
Information Agency.384
B. Renewable Energy Escalation
Natural gas powered generation and renewable electric energy
quickly are supplanting coal generation in the last five years.385 During
the past decade the price of implementing many renewable energy
alternatives has dropped dramatically.386 For example, the cost of wind
power has dropped within the range of being competitive with the price
of some more traditional fossil fuel resources for the production of

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/white-house-set-to-adoptsweeping-curbs-on-carbon-pollution/2015/08/01/ba6627fa-385c-11e5-b6731df005a0fb28_story.html.
380. Myskens, et al., Mapping, supra note 378.
381. See Wendy Koch, EPA Seeks 30% Cut in Power Plant Carbon Emissions by 2030,
USA TODAY (June 3, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/06/02/epa-proposes-sharp-cutspower-plant-emissions/9859913/.
382. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AEO2014 PROJECTS MORE COAL-FIRED POWER
PLANT
RETIREMENTS
BY
2016
THAN
HAVE
BEEN
SCHEDULED,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15031 (last updated Mar. 10, 2014).
383. Michael Bastasch, Report: EPA Regulations to Accelerate Coal Plant Shutdowns,
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 14, 2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/14/report-epa-regulations-toaccelerate-coal-plant-shutdowns/.
384. Id.
385. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS, RENEWABLES PROJECTED TO
PROVIDE LARGER SHARES OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION, (May 4,2015),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21072.
386. See infra notes 393-98.

1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

A LEGAL “JURISDICTIONAL TRAIN WRECK”

4/15/2019 4:24 PM

61

electricity.387 Wind, along with natural gas, has dominated new sources
of electric energy deployed in the most recent decade.388
Use of renewable energy continues to grow rapidly in the United
States. In 2013, electricity generated from renewable energy
technologies, including conventional hydropower, represented thirteen
percent of total U.S. electricity, up from nine percent in 2005.389 In 2012,
wind energy was the most deployed new U.S. electricity generation
capacity, contributing forty-three percent of all new electric
generation.390 Wind energy provided 4.5 percent of total U.S. power
supplies in 2013.391 Since 2009, U.S. wind generation has tripled and
solar generation has grown twentyfold.392
The cost to install photovoltaic solar panels has fallen
dramatically; PV module prices have experienced a decline from
around 1.90 dollars per watt in 2009 to 0.36 dollars per watt in 2017,
and lower in some regions of the world.393 Inverter prices, for the
equipment necessary to convert photovoltaic direct current to
alternating current so that it can be moved on the grid, have also
declined by more than sixty percent in cost from 0.60 to 1.00+ dollars
per watt in 2005 to under 0.20 dollars per watt in 2013.394 This has
allowed the solar photovoltaic market to grow at an average rate of
more than forty percent each year since 2000.395 Solar energy was
forecasted to be cost competitive with retail electricity prices in forty387. Tara Patel, Fossil Fuels Losing Cost Advantage Over Solar, Wind, IEA Says,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-31/solarwind-power-costs-drop-as-fossil-fuels-increase-iea-says.
388. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR INDUSTRY DATA: SOLAR INDUSTRY
GROWING AT A RECORD PACE 2-3 (2018) http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solarindustry-data.
389. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,695 (referencing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040 ES-6 (2015)).
390. Energy Dept. Reports: U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing Reaches
Record Highs, ENERGY.GOV, (Aug. 6, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-dept-reportsus-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-reaches-record-highs.
391. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,803 (citing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 106 tbl. 7.2b (May 2015)).
392. See id.
393. WILSON RICKERSON, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH.
DEPLOYMENT (IEA-RETD), RESIDENTIAL PROSUMERS-DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS
(RE-PROSUMERS) 9 (Holly Wilson & Henry Barrett eds., Meister Consultants Group, 2014)
(relying on Jade Jones, Regional PV Module Pricing Dynamics: What You Need to Know,
GREEN TECH MEDIA (Nov. 22, 2013)); Nicholas Rinaldi, Solar PV Module Costs to Fall to
36 Cents per Watt by 2017, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 18, 2013).
394. RICKERSON, supra note 393, at 9 (relying on Ian Clover, IHS cuts global inverter
market forecast in face of dramatic price drops, PV MAG. (Oct. 16, 2013). See also
NAVIGANT CONSULTING INC., A REVIEW OF PV INVERTER TECHNOLOGY COST AND
PERFORMANCE PROJECTIONS 3 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab. 2006)).
395. RICKERSON, supra note 393, at 10.
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seven U.S. states by 2016, with maintenance of current subsidies,
according to Deutsche Bank.396 Solar electric energy is now costcompetitive with traditional fossil fuels due to substantial subsidies397
and it is projected to dramatically expand in use in the coming decade.398

Figure 4
In a recent six-year period, the costs of solar photovoltaic cells and
wind power has decreased by forty to sixty percent. See Figure 5. The
global market for renewable energy is projected to grow to 460 billion
dollars per year by 2030.399 Wind is now the predominant new power
generation source added each year.400 As solar energy becomes the first
choice for power generation technology for consumers, renewable
396. Ari Natter, Solar Energy to Reach ‘Grid Parity’ by 2016 In Nearly All States,
Deutsche Bank Predicts, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 27, 2014). This is based on the assumption
that the cost of solar systems will decline by about twenty percent more, from less than three
dollars per watt installed to less than 2.50 dollars per watt installed by 2016, resulting in a
price in those states from nine to fourteen cents/Kwh, and lowered financing cost for solar
projects. The average cost of residential electricity in the U.S. in 2013 was 12.12 cents/Kwh,
and was 8.95 cents/Kwh in 2004. These assumptions factor in ongoing U.S. subsidies from
the thirty percent investment tax credit for solar energy, which is scheduled to drop to ten
percent in the future.
397. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, IRENA POLICY BRIEF - RENEWABLES
BECOMING MORE COMPETITIVE WORLDWIDE 1 (2012).
398. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR INDUSTRY DATA: SOLAR INDUSTRY
GROWING AT A RECORD PACE 2-3 (2018), http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solarindustry-data.
399. See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKET
OUTLOOK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2011), http://bnef.com/WhitePapers/download/53.688.
400. See Roy L. Hales, ⅔ of New US Electricity Capacity Was from Wind in October,
CLEAN TECHNICA, Nov. 24, 2014, http://cleantechnica.com/2014/11/24/two-thirds-of-usinstallations-were-from-the-wind-sector/.
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energy will absorb almost two-thirds of the spending on new power
plants over the next twenty-five years, dwarfing spending on fossil
fuels.401

Figure 5
C. Natural Gas As Substitute Fuel

New combined-cycle gas turbines, a spin-off technology from the
aviation industry, have transformed the economics of the power
industry, by providing a more efficient means to convert fossil fuel
energy inputs to electric output.402 Gas-fired units burn a ‘cleaner’ fuel
than coal, typically causing less maintenance expenses for units which
burn coal compared to coal or oil.403 Natural gas combined cycle
turbine facilities, which can be modified to increase by up to fifty percent
of their start-up times to accommodate pressure and temperature
transients of their steam turbines and readiness of their heat recovery
steam generators, still may not be flexible enough to be able to follow
and instantaneously respond to the ongoing intermittency caused by use
of greater wind and solar power in the grid.404
401. Ehren Goossens, Renewables to Beat Fossil Fuels With $3.7 Trillion Solar Boom,
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2015).
402. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 84, at § 2.9.
403. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL, tbl. 8.4,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html.
404. Nicolas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generation Plants in Integrating
Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33, 34 (2010); see Merrill Quintrell,
Reducing Cycling Damage to Combined Cycle Steam Turbines, POWER (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.powermag.com/reducing-cycling-damage-to-combined-cycle-steam-turbines/.
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Hydro-fracking technology greatly increases the recoverable
amount of underground natural gas in the United States and this
technology is now being exported to the rest of the world.405 With
more supply of natural gas methane, the price of gas in the U.S. market
has dropped dramatically, and demand for it has increased equally
dramatically.406 Within the previous five years, natural gas prices have
fallen precipitously by one-third of their prior value, which was
already low for the last ten years of natural gas prices from 2008 to the
present. 407 They now are only a modest premium over coal prices
compared on an equivalent energy value of the fuels.408
Natural gas is now cost-competitive with the traditionally much
cheaper cost of coal for power generation, and has the added benefit
of gas producing only approximately one-half as much CO2 emissions
as coal, no particulate matter criteria pollutants, no SO2 criteria
pollutant emissions, and the ability to emit less NO x.409 Because of this
new shale gas supply, the real price of natural gas in 2016 is below
the price it was twenty years earlier in 1996.410

405. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Boom in American Liquefied Natural Gas Is Shaking Up
the
Energy
World,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/business/energy-environment/liquified-natural-gasworld-markets.html; see generally EPA, THE PROCESS OF HYDRAULIC FRACKING (Oct. 18,
2017), https://perma.cc/PM9M-QCQ6 (Hydrofracking is a well-stimulation technique that
employs high pressure fluids consisting of water, sand, and a mixture of chemicals to create
and maintain small fissures in sub-surface shale rock, creating an escape path for otherwise
trapped methane gas to move to perforated wellbores for extraction from the wells as a usable
fuel).
406. MACROTRENDS,
NATURAL
GAS
PRICES
HISTORICAL
CHART,
https://www.macrotrends.net/2478/natural-gas-prices-historical-chart (In January 2014,
natural gas prices at the Henry Hub were 5.44 dollars per mmbtu, and were 3.53 dollars per
mmbtu in November 2018, a decrease of thirty-five percent within this period of slightly less
than five years, and a decrease of 76.8 percent from the price of 15.22 dollars per mmbtu in
June 2008.); see also Blue Quadrant Capital Mgmt., The Outlook for U.S. Natural Gas Prices,
2018-2019, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 25, 2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4116380outlook-u-s-natural-gas-prices-2018minus-2019.
407. See Gail Teverberg, Why U.S. Natural Gas Prices are so Low-Are Changes
Needed?, OUR FINITE WORLD (Mar. 23, 2012), http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/23/whyus-natural- gas-prices-are-so-low-are-changes-needed/.
408. See Zachary Shahan, Low Costs of Solar Power & Wind Power Crush Coal, Crush
Nuclear, & Beat Natural Gas, CLEAN TECHNICA (Dec. 25, 2016),
https://cleantechnica.com/2016/12/25/cost-of-solar-power-vs-cost-of-wind-power-coalnuclear-natural-gas/.
409. See AM. GAS ASS’N, CLEANER ENERGY, http://www.aga.org/environmentalbenefits-natural-gas (last visited July 25, 2018); see UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
COAL AND AIR POLLUTION, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossilfuels/coal-air-pollution#.W-cLNxNKgdU.
410. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HENRY HUB NATURAL GAS SPOT PRICE,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm (last updated July 25, 2018).
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The projection of the U.S. Department of Energy is that there will
be a significant increase in U.S. natural gas usage with a corresponding
significant decrease in coal use in the next twenty-five years, as shown
in Figure 6.411

Figure 6412
With these different technologies of coal, natural gas combined
cycle (NGCC) generation, and wind and solar renewable energy, the
future for U.S. energy will be determined by the least cost economics of
power generation.413 In addition to the CPP, federal tax policy affects
the economics of these choices.414 In 2015, there was a multi-year
extension and phase-down of the renewable Production Tax Credit
(PTC) which was previously scheduled to expire at the end of 2014 and
is typically used by wind power projects and the Investment Tax Credit
(ITC) which typically is used by solar power projects.415 Before
Congress extended these programs, the PTC had expired at the end of
the 2014 tax year, and the ITC was set to drop to a credit of ten percent
of project costs at the end of 2016.416 At the end of 2015, the PTC was
extended and phased out by 2020 while the ITC thirty percent tax credit
declines to ten percent in 2021 and continues.417
411. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FOSSIL FUELS STILL DOMINATE U.S. ENERGY
CONSUMPTION DESPITE RECENT MARKET SHARE DECLINE, (July 1, 2016),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=26912.
412. Id.
413. See supra note 410.
414. See FERREY, supra note 82, at §§ 3:53-3:59.115 (discussing federal tax policy
affecting the power sector).
415. Id. at §§ 3:59.10, 3:59.40.
416. John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, Renewable Tax Extenders: The Bridge to the
Clean Power Plan, RHODIUM GRP. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://rhg.com/notes/renewable-taxextenders-the-bridge-to-the-clean-power-plan (Please note that the figures reproduced in this
article are no longer available on the website).
417. FERREY, supra note 84, at § 3:59.
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As shown in Figure 7, coal use declines dramatically with or
without these federal tax credits. However, without the tax credits
extended, in the left image in Figure 7, coal is replaced by natural gas
NGCC units as the least-cost option; with the PTC and ITC extended in
the right image in Figure 7, solar and wind power assume the dominant
role through 2021, adding almost 300 Terawatt-hours (Twh) of
generation in lieu of NGCC generation, and continue to be the
technology of choice.418 This dominance of new renewable energy in
lieu of natural gas and coal reduces U.S. carbon emissions.

Figure 7. Change in 2015-2030 Generation from Base Case with
CPP with PTC and ITC419
VII. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The ongoing legal challenge to the CPP, more than two years after
the Supreme Court enjoined the regulation even before a lower court
decision on the merits,420 pivots on the Court’s Michigan decision.421
Subject to the stay, the D.C. Circuit on its own motions has held back
any ruling on the merits of the regulation in abeyance.422 Even the
Michigan foundation is still not finally resolved before the D.C. Circuit,
as is not the challenge to the Clean Power Plan. Both of these stillpending cases have in common the fact that:
418. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 416.
419. Id. “Other Clean” includes nuclear power, hydro, and biomass power.
420. W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000; see Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court Put the Brakes
on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 9 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-courtputs-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/?utm_term=.dd512a870f71.
421. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
422. W. Va. v. EPA, Case No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2017).
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 Both were designed by the Obama Administration to discourage
operation of coal-fired power plants
 Both appear from EPA data to be not cost-effective unless
unregulated criteria pollutant “co-benefits” are counted and/or
international benefits (beyond U.S. borders and beyond U.S.
legal authority to regulate extraterritorially) are counted

Still unresolved in both pending Court matters is whether an
executive agency can add estimated indirect incidental “co-benefits,” not
included in what a rule regulates, as an additional operand to reverse
lesser direct regulatory benefits than the rule’s costs? The resolution of
these cases of first impression reset future court deference to agencies.
This withdrawal of deference recalibrates separation and weighting of
powers among the branches of government.
The indefinite stay of the Clean Power Plan is a key step in a
progressive retreat from Chevron deference to agency decisions begun
in 2014 in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,423 and continued in 2015
in King v. Burwell424 and Michigan v. EPA.425 The CPP hovers in
suspended legal animation after these decisions. Underscoring the legal
issue is the recent controversy on the use of coal versus renewable
energy or other sources to power the U.S. economy, elevated to a major
issue in the most recent presidential election.426 The CPP’s benefits only
exceeded its costs due to the Obama Administration’s counting of
unregulated “co-benefits” as well as extraterritorial international
benefits outside of U.S. borders.427 The Trump Administration repeal of
the CPP, estimated now to save thirty-three billion dollars in avoided
compliance costs in 2030,428 no longer counts:
 Mitigation benefits to climate occurring globally outside the
United States over which the agency has no legal jurisdiction
and which the regulation does not address
 Indirect “co-benefits” of pollutants that the Plan does not regulate
nor address429

423. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2013) (disfavoring new agency
interpretation).
424. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (disregarding opinion of non-expert
agencies).
425. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (prerequisite de novo agency consideration of costs
before regulation).
426. See A. Parker & C. Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan: More Fossil Fuels
and Fewer Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016 (“We’re going to bring back the coal industry,
save the coal industry,” he said “I love those people.”).
427. See supra notes 182, 192-93.
428. See supra note 172.
429. See supra note 182.
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More important than the unusual legal predicate for this stay, is the
retreat from Chevron deference, progressively etched by the Court in
Michigan v. EPA,430 UARG v. EPA,431 and other recent decisions.432
Michigan is the mirror opposite of traditional Chevron deference, a
potential shift in Supreme Court reliance on quantitative, economic cost
consideration in environmental regulation.433 The ongoing CPP
litigation and MATs litigation raise legal issues of first impression that
are redefining administrative deference, without “a jurisdictional train
wreck.”434 These decisions shift the balance of power to construe
Congressional statutes from the executive branch to the courts.

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

See Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

